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NEPAL’S MAOISTS: PURISTS OR PRAGMATISTS? 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Nepal’s Maoists have changed their strategy and tactics 
but not yet their goals. In 1996 they launched a “people’s 
war” to establish a communist republic but ten years later 
ended it by accepting multiparty democracy; their armed 
struggle targeted the parliamentary system but they 
are now working alongside their former enemies, the 
mainstream parties, in an interim legislature and coalition 
government. Their commitment to pluralistic politics and 
society is far from definitive, and their future course will 
depend on both internal and external factors. While they 
have signed up to a peaceful, multiparty transition, they 
continue to hone alternative plans for more revolutionary 
change. 
Maoist strategy is shaped by a tension between purity and 
pragmatism. Although they stick to certain established 
principles, they have long been willing to shift course if 
they identify strategic weaknesses. Their changed approach 
was demanded by recognition of three critical flaws in 
their original plan: (i) they concluded their belief in military 
victory had been misplaced; (ii) they acknowledged they 
had misread the likelihood of determined international 
opposition; and (iii) they woke up to the failures that caused 
the collapse of twentieth-century communist regimes. 
Despite having an authoritarian outlook, the Maoists 
maintained a culture of debate within their party; key issues 
have been widely discussed and hotly contested. From the 
end of the 1990s, they have moved gradually toward 
a more moderate stance. They changed positions in 
acknowledging the 1990 democracy movement as a 
success (they had earlier characterised it as a “betrayal”), 
in abandoning the immediate goal of a Mao-style “new 
democracy” and, in November 2005, by aligning themselves 
with the mainstream parties in favour of multiparty 
democracy. 
The Maoists have cultivated formerly hostile forces, such 
as the Indian government and the staunchly anti-Maoist 
Communist Party of India (Marxist), to the extent of 
alienating their foreign allies. Supporters such as the 
Revolutionary Internationalist Movement and Indian 
Maoists had backed their insurgency but have been vocally 
critical of the compromises made in the peace process. 
They think their Nepali comrades have betrayed 
fundamental principles and thrown away the practical 
advantages they had secured through their armed struggle. 
For Nepal’s Maoists, however, the balance sheet at the end 
of ten years of “people’s war” is more complex. They 
believe they have secured some lasting advantages, from 
their own dramatic rise to influence (with a support base 
and military force hardly imaginable in 1996) to their 
reshaping of the national political agenda (promoting 
formerly taboo causes such as republicanism and 
federalism). But the course of the war persuaded most of 
their leadership that they could not go it alone and would 
have to be more flexible if they were to build on these 
gains. 
The peace process has forced practical and theoretical 
rethinking. Leaders have tried to present a more moderate 
image as they balance complex equations of domestic and 
international support and opposition. Maoist ministers 
have to cooperate with colleagues from other parties and 
work with the bureaucracy even as they plan a possible 
insurrection and plot to isolate “regressive” opponents. 
Ideologically, they define the peace process as a transitional 
phase in which they can destroy the “old regime” and 
restructure the state. They justify this by saying their 
acceptance of a bourgeois “democratic republic” is only a 
stepping stone on the way to a true “people’s republic”. 
Leaders argue that they can create a new form of “peaceful 
revolution” that is true to their communist aims but reflects 
the reality of Nepal’s politics. 
It is tempting to brand the Maoists as either rigid radicals 
or unprincipled opportunists but neither characterisation 
explains the whole picture. Their threats to revert to mass 
insurrection satisfy traditionalists in their own movement 
and cannot be ignored. But leaders who have fought 
hard to forge a new approach will be loath to turn their 
backs on the hard-won advantages they have secured 
through compromise. They know they face internal 
opposition but believe they can hold the line as long as the 
peace process maintains momentum and allows them to 
achieve some of their headline goals. 
Their likely behaviour as the process moves forward, 
therefore, will depend upon the role of other political actors 
Nepals’s Maoists: Purists or Pragmatists? 
Crisis Group Asia Report N°132, 18 May 2007 Page ii 
 
 
 
as much as their own decisions. If the mainstream parties 
keep up a strong commitment to the constituent assembly 
process, the Maoists will find it hard to back out. If this 
route is blocked, the Maoists may find their effort at 
controlled rebellion slipping into renewed conflict beyond 
their leaders’ control. If this were to happen, the Maoists 
themselves would be big losers. But so would the 
democratic parties and, even more so, the people of Nepal. 
Kathmandu/Brussels, 18 May 2007 
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NEPAL’S MAOISTS: PURISTS OR PRAGMATISTS? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Nepal’s Maoists are revising their methods and 
reconsidering their goals.1 Their most significant political 
shift has been a conditional acceptance of multiparty 
democracy – a fundamental ideological concession – 
and they have in effect abandoned central tenets of their 
people’s war strategy. The move towards a more pluralistic 
approach has taken place over several years. While the 
Maoists’ internal debate over ends and means has been 
more or less continuous, three major turning points stand 
out: 
 The decision “to defend the achievements of 
1990 mass movement” (1999–2001).2 They had 
earlier labelled the 1990 compromise between the 
palace and major political parties a “betrayal” of 
the people. 2001 saw the first serious review of 
strategy. Their second national conference analysed 
the problems of the international communist 
movement and pinpointed the challenges for their 
own movement, in particular the difficulty of 
making progress with a purely rural focus.3  
 The decision to abandon the immediate goal of 
“new democracy” (May 2003). In its place they 
adopted “Development of Democracy in the 
Twenty-first Century” (DDTC), a concept that 
accepted political competition within a socialist 
 
 
 
1 For background on the Maoists, see Crisis Group Asia Report 
N°104, Nepal’s Maoists: Their Aims, Structure and Strategy, 
27 October 2005. Recent Crisis Group reporting on Nepal 
includes Crisis Group Asia Report N°115, Nepal: From People 
Power to Peace?, 10 May 2006; Crisis Group Asia Report 
N°126, Nepal’s Peace Agreement: Making it Work, 15 December 
2006; and Crisis Group Asia Report N°128, Nepal’s 
Constitutional Process, 26 February 2007. As in past reports, 
for the sake of simplicity this paper uses the labels Communist 
Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN(M)) and “Maoist” more or less 
interchangeably. Strictly speaking, the CPN(M) is the guiding 
force of three separate elements that make up the broader Maoist 
movement: the party, the army and the united front. For an 
explanation, see Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Maoists, op. cit. 
2 Baburam Bhattarai, “Aitihasik baithakko durgami 
mahattvabare”, Janadesh, 17 August 1999. 
3 Mahan agragami chhalang: itihasko apariharya avashyakta 
(CPN(M) Central Publications Department, 2001).
system.4 They laid the ground for this move away 
from traditional communist thinking by criticising 
the weaknesses of their mentors, Mao and Stalin. 
 The decision to ally with the parliamentary 
parties for “full democracy” (November 2005). 
In their twelve-point agreement with the mainstream 
Seven-Party Alliance (SPA),5 they accepted multi-
party politics and made their immediate goal the 
formation of a democratic republic through an 
elected constituent assembly (CA).6 This bourgeois/ 
capitalist republic would be a stepping stone on the 
way to a true “people’s republic” embodying the 
classical Maoist principles of “new democracy”.7 
After the April 2006 mass movement, which forced 
the king to relinquish power, the Maoists have tried to 
present a moderate image. Chairman and overall leader 
Prachanda even assured donor agencies that they had 
become “rightist communists”.8 But the Maoists’ transition 
to democratic politics is far from complete and the 
compromise stance has failed to win backing throughout 
the party. They retain the end goal of a people’s republic 
from which most liberal parties would be excluded, and 
they have done little to change their militaristic approach 
to politics, in which the exercise of force is an integral 
part. The threats of violent insurrection are partly bluster 
but should the peace process stall, they are both 
 
4 “Present Situation And Our Historical Task”, document 
adopted by May 2003 CPN(M) central committee meeting, at 
http://cpnm.org/new/English/worker/9issue/document.htm. 
5 The parliamentary parties that make up the SPA are the Nepali 
Congress (NC); Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-
Leninist, UML); Nepal Sadbhavana Party (Anandidevi, NSP 
(A)); Nepali Congress (Democratic, NC(D)); Janamorcha Nepal; 
Nepal Workers and Peasants Party (NWPP); and United Left 
Front (ULF). 
6 See Crisis Group Asia Report N°106, Nepal’s New Alliance: 
The Mainstream Parties and the Maoists, 28 November 2005. 
7 For more on these terms, see below. 
8 Prachanda made this comment at a December 2006 donors 
conference hosted by the World Bank. “Prachandako naya path”, 
Budhabar, 10 January 2007. Prachanda is both chairman of 
the CPN(M) and supreme commander of the Maoists’ military 
wing, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA); when Maoists 
speak of “party headquarters”, in effect they mean Prachanda 
himself. 
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theoretically and practically prepared to revert to more 
traditional revolutionary tactics. 
This report examines the Maoists’ political culture and its 
development, drawing on detailed research in two main 
areas – Maoist internal politics and international linkages 
– to assess the movement’s nature as well as possible 
scenarios as the peace process moves forward. Some 
observers have consistently warned that the Maoists will 
never change; others think they are ready for a trouble-free 
conversion to parliamentary politics along the lines of the 
transformation of the mainstream Communist Party of 
Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist, UML) in the early 1990s. 
Supporters can marshal convincing evidence but neither 
of these starkly opposing interpretations can accurately 
or adequately explain Maoist politics. The evolution of 
their strategy and behaviour has always been, and will 
continue to be, a complex process conditioned by internal 
debates and external conditions. It is too early to predict 
with confidence where this process will end. Instead, this 
report aims to clarify the factors and relationships that will 
shape it. 
II. THE CHANGED MAOISTS 
A. THEIR STRATEGIC WEAKNESSES 
The Maoists were forced to revise their strategy because 
of its shortcomings. Prachanda has suggested two reasons 
lie behind the change in line: the unfavourable “international 
power balance” and the “overall economic, political and 
social realities of the country”.9 In fact, he and his 
colleagues slowly came to realise they had made 
miscalculations in three critical areas: (i) their belief that 
an overall military victory was possible was mistaken; (ii) 
their reading of the international environment had to change 
(especially after 9/11), and the antagonistic approach 
towards India was counterproductive; and (iii) their faith 
in previous communist systems eroded as they analysed 
the reasons for communist regimes’ collapse. 
No military victory. The major factor that forced a rethink 
was their realisation that military victory was impossible. 
During their campaign’s first five years, they quickly 
overran the poorly armed police force and hoped to defeat 
the army with similar ease. They held sway over large areas 
of the countryside although, in line with their strategy, 
they focused on controlling the population, rather than 
winning territory. They set up parallel governments but 
had no permanent, protected base areas and could not 
capture and hold district headquarters. 
This stalemate led to their first strategic rethink of the 
people’s war approach. In 2001 they adopted a new line, 
Prachandapath, that added a Leninist twist of urban 
insurrection to the stagnating rural focus.10 However, the 
Maoists have never had a wide support base in Kathmandu, 
and the government relatively easily thwarted their efforts 
to build networks. Similarly, the internationally-backed 
Royal Nepalese Army (RNA)11 proved a more stubborn 
foe than they had expected.12 Thus, the twin-pronged 
Prachandapath plan also failed: they needed either vast 
 
 
9 Interview with Prachanda, The Kathmandu Post, 7 February 
2006. 
10 Prachanda presented his new strategy to the CPN(M)’s 
second national conference in 2001, which approved it. See 
Mahan agragami chhalang, op. cit.
11 After the April 2006 movement, the RNA dropped the 
adjective “Royal” and is now simply the Nepalese Army (NA). 
12 Prachanda said: “When we first attacked the feudal elements’ 
royal army, we believed that we could conquer Kathmandu 
militarily. But later, when countries like the U.S., the UK and 
India started supporting the royal army militarily – against our 
people’s war and the Nepali people’s revolt – that posed some 
difficulties. That is why we believe that in today’s world it is 
not possible to move forward only militarily”. Prachanda, “Naya 
nepalko margachitra koreko chha”, Pratyakraman, November 
2006. 
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popular support or clear military superiority but they 
discovered they had neither. Maoist attacks within the 
Kathmandu valley in 2005 (Sankhu) and early 2006 
(Thankot and Dadhikot) had some psychological impact 
but never seriously threatened the capital militarily. 
Hostile international environment. The Maoists thought 
that their growing strength would force international players 
to live with them even if they did not like them. They 
believed domestic pre-eminence would even trump New 
Delhi’s instinctive fears of a hard-line communist neighbour. 
Probably over-optimistic from the start, the prospect of 
international acceptance was definitively ended by the 
changed post-9/11 attitudes towards political violence. 
In 2001 the Nepali government branded the Maoists 
“terrorists”, followed by India and the U.S.13
The Maoist response to the changed scenario was counter-
intuitive and ultimately counter-productive: they chose 
to go on the offensive, breaking off talks and attacking 
the RNA directly to bring it onto the battlefield. This in 
turn invited international military aid to an army that could 
now portray itself as the last line of defence against a 
terrorist takeover. India, the U.S. and UK were happy to 
oblige; despite concerns about strategy and human rights 
violations, no outside power opposed the basic plan of 
defending the state against armed insurgents. The Maoists 
had long seen India as their greatest external threat, fearing 
that a military offensive to capture central power could 
prompt Indian intervention with U.S. support.14 They 
chose to test this possibility – and discovered that a hostile 
international environment was enough to upset their 
plans without any resort to direct intervention. 
Shortcomings of communist models. The Maoists were 
initially uncompromising supporters of the five luminaries 
of their communist heritage: Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin 
and Mao. However, they had always recognised that a 
successful revolution in Nepal would have to modify 
classical models. This provided cover to review the 
weaknesses of the international communist movement, 
a turning point coming when the 2001 second national 
conference of their Communist Party Nepal (CPN(M)) 
accepted that Stalin had committed serious mistakes.15 
 
 
13 Indian ministers, led by then Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh, 
started to brand the Maoists terrorists from 2001; the U.S. 
government listed the Maoists under Executive Order 13,224 
for terrorist activity on 31 October 2003; see www.state.gov/ 
documents/organization/83383.pdf. 
14 Crisis Group interview, CPN(M) central committee member, 
Kathmandu, January 2007. 
15 The conference concluded that one third of Stalin’s thinking 
and actions were wrong. See Nepal kamyunist parti (maobadi) 
ko aitihasik dastavejharu (CPN(M) Mechi-Koshi Regional 
Bureau, 2006), p.156.
The May 2003 central committee meeting16 further analysed 
why the Soviet and Eastern European communist regimes 
had collapsed and “counter-revolution” had occurred so 
easily. 
While still underground, Prachanda had spoken publicly 
about this critical reassessment of classical models: “Why 
did the communist movement suffer such an enormous 
setback? Why did the Russian revolution get overcome 
by counter-revolution? Why did China also go down that 
path? This was a debate within the central committee for 
many years”.17 The Maoists concluded that they could 
not simply blame a “capitalist conspiracy”; rather, the 
weakness lay within the communist governance system 
and could only be addressed by allowing a degree of 
political competition. This paved the way for their revised 
policy on multiparty pluralism. 
B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR NEW LINE 
The Maoists’ decision to enter mainstream politics was 
not unprecedented. They had experimented with the 
parliamentary system, emerging as the third largest party 
(albeit with only nine seats) in the 1991 general election.18 
Throughout their armed insurgency, they maintained some 
relations with mainstream parties, civil society and the 
media, keeping an entry to open politics a viable option. 
But the prospect of such a radical change in strategy 
prompted a long intra-party debate and bitter clashes 
between those advocating a fresh approach and those who 
preferred to stick more closely to the original plan. Two 
senior leaders who might have played a part in these 
debates, Mohan Baidya (Kiran) and C.P. Gajurel (Gaurav), 
were out of the picture following arrest and imprisonment 
in India. The remaining key players were Chairman 
Prachanda, Baburam Bhattarai, Ram Bahadur Thapa 
(Badal), Posta Bahadur Bogati (Diwakar) and Krishna 
Bahadur Mahara. While Bhattarai urged a new line, he met 
with scepticism and resistance from most of his colleagues. 
 
16 The central committee, which has fluctuated in size from 
roughly three dozen to 100 members, is the CPN(M)’s primary 
decision-making body. Above it stood the politburo and, above 
that, the standing committee; both of these were dissolved in 
October 2005. For the membership of these bodies immediately 
prior to the reorganisation, see Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s 
Maoists, op. cit., Appendix C. 
17 Interview with Prachanda, The Hindu, published on 8, 9 and 
10 February 2006, at www.hindu.com/thehindu/nic/ maoist.htm. 
18 Before starting the insurgency, the Maoists were involved 
in parliamentary politics through the Samyukta Janamorcha, 
their above-ground wing led by Baburam Bhattarai. 
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1. Bhattarai’s battle for change 
While they had been quite quick to recognise the 
weaknesses of the international communist movement, the 
Maoists hesitated to explore alternative lines. Although 
the CPN(M) was theoretically committed to developing 
policy through an ongoing debate within the party (the 
“two-line struggle”), in practice proponents of new ideas 
faced great obstacles. 
The proposal for a constituent assembly, first developed 
for negotiations with the government in early 2001, was 
intertwined with the strategy debate. When it was adopted 
as a negotiating platform, there was little understanding of 
its significance in the wider party. Most of the leadership 
viewed it as only a tactical ploy to isolate the monarchy 
and use polarisation over the issue to open up the way for 
the long-planned “new democratic republic”. However, 
Bhattarai and some other leaders19 had a different plan, 
which emerged during the 2003 negotiations alongside 
the shift to the DDTC concept.20 Bhattarai saw the 
constituent assembly demand as a strategic turning point 
that could pave the way for a “new model of revolution”.21 
He believed that an alliance with the parliamentary forces 
could win Indian support and form the basis for a mass 
republican movement. The constituent assembly could 
be one point of alignment with the parties, and he also 
argued that the Maoists should accept competitive 
multiparty politics.22
However, Bhattarai lost the argument. The August 2004 
central committee meeting took the opposite line: instead 
of targeting the monarchy, it decided to enter the “strategic 
offensive” phase and considered reaching an understanding 
with “patriotic forces” (including the king) to counter 
“upcoming Indian intervention”.23 The meeting also 
passed a “centralisation of leadership” resolution appointing 
Prachanda supreme commander of the Maoist military 
forces as well as head of their shadow government, the 
United Revolutionary People’s Council (URPC) – a 
position held by Bhattarai. Some leaders keen to reinforce 
their chairman’s grip on the whole movement urged that 
Prachandapath should be developed into a more ambitious 
 
 
19 Bhattarai’s supporters were mainly those who, like him, had 
joined the Maoists in the early 1990s. They included figures 
such as Ram Karki, Haribol Gajurel, Hisila Yami and Dinanath 
Sharma (who only joined the party in 2001). 
20 It was also at this time that they put forward specific demands 
for the kind of change a constituent assembly should effect. 
21 Baburam Bhattarai, “Royal Regression and the Question 
of a Democratic Republic in Nepal”, Economic and Political 
Weekly, 9 April 2005. 
22 Crisis Group interview, CPN(M) leader close to Baburam 
Bhattarai, Kathmandu, November 2006. 
23 Prachanda, press statement, 1 September 2004. 
ideology of “Prachanda Thought”, implying he should 
stand alongside Mao in the pantheon of communist thinking. 
Bhattarai disagreed with the centralised leadership and the 
tactical line of confronting India rather than the king.24 
In November 2004 he presented his reservations in a four-
point letter and then in thirteen more detailed “questions 
for discussion” submitted to the party headquarters.25 He 
argued that the recent decisions went against the spirit 
of the party’s second conference and May 2003 central 
committee meeting that had called for the “creative 
development of Marxism, Leninism and Maoism”.26 
A January 2005 politburo meeting rejected Bhattarai’s 
arguments; after Prachanda presented a critique “on comrade 
Laldhoj’s [Bhattarai’s] letter and other activities”, his 
colleagues concluded that Bhattarai had breached party 
discipline and was proposing a “rightist deviation”. He was 
suspended from all party posts indefinitely.27 Bhattarai 
tried to fight back, complaining that the decision went 
“against the accepted rules and norms of any revolutionary 
communist party”.28 But the leadership stood firm: there 
 
24 Bhattarai charged that “to exercise proletarian dictatorship in 
an effective manner by ensuring supervision, intervention 
and control of the mass over the party, the army and the state 
and to pave the path to communism through the means of 
continuous revolution, some ideas and methods were developed 
including that of not jumbling up…the party, the army and 
the state as in the past models of socialism. The recent central 
committee meeting has however, tended to go against those 
decisions”. Baburam Bhattarai, “Questions for discussion”, letter 
submitted to CPN(M) headquarters, 30 November 2006. 
25 His first letter was sent on 11 November 2004; his longer paper 
on 30 November. He had complained that “at times there 
appears a wrong thinking [among the party leadership], which 
regards feudalism as more progressive than capitalism”. Ibid. 
26 Ibid. However, the party establishment suspected Bhattarai’s 
disagreement stemmed more from his removal as head of the 
URPC than from ideological differences. In an internal document 
presented to the politburo, Prachanda did not pull his punches: 
“As long as [Bhattarai] was chief of the united front he had no 
problem with Marxism-Leninism-Maoism and Prachandapath 
or the development of ideology and development of democracy 
in the twenty-first century; but once his own position came into 
question he saw everything as retreat and regression”. Prachanda, 
“On comrade Laldhoj’s letter and other activities”, document 
presented to and passed by the January 2005 CPN(M) politburo 
meeting. 
27 Disciplinary action was also taken against two other leaders: 
Hisila Yami, Bhattarai’s wife and now a minister in the interim 
government, and Dinanath Sharma. 
28 Bhattarai cautioned: “we have to see whether we will further 
develop Prachandapath by stepping ahead from the ideological 
mile-stones of our party, like [the] historical second national 
conference and the ‘development of democracy in the 21st 
century’, or whether we will make a historic blunder by pursuing 
a regressive path knowingly or unknowingly”. Baburam Bhattarai, 
note of dissent presented to CPN(M) headquarters, 30 January 
2005. 
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would be no change in strategy and no sympathy for their 
comrade’s deviationist tendencies. 
2. A messy U-turn 
The Maoists could have coped relatively comfortably 
with the fall-out from the dismissal of their de facto 
number two leader: Bhattarai did not command a wide 
support base in the party or military and was not in any 
case seeking the leadership. But significant shifts 
outside their movement rapidly forced a more positive 
reassessment of Bhattarai’s case for change. 
The February 2005 royal coup upset the plan to entice the 
palace into an anti-Indian alliance: it would have just been 
too hard to justify dealing with the king after such an 
autocratic step. Moreover, the coup also forced mainstream 
party leaders to recognise the weakness of their situation, 
that without allies they were at the mercy of both the king 
and the Maoists. This strengthened the hand of party 
activists (both NC and UML) who had been pressing their 
leaders to accept a constituent assembly and agree to 
limited cooperation with the Maoists to defeat royal rule. 
By May 2005 the major parties had accepted this and 
were privately urging the Maoists to be more flexible. 
These pressures led to a quick Maoist U-turn. Prachanda 
decided to start talks with both the SPA and India.29 He 
rehabilitated Bhattarai, entrusting him with the first 
negotiations in Delhi. This about-turn was caused largely 
by the lack of other good options. The Maoists realised 
they could not capture power single-handedly and feared 
that King Gyanendra might win the argument in Delhi and 
persuade India to put them under unbearable pressure.  
After rounds of discussions with the parties and the Indian 
government, the CPN(M) held a central committee meeting 
in Chunbang (in their mid-west stronghold Rukum) 
in October 2005. It approved the plan of breaking the 
triangular stalemate with the monarchy and parliamentary 
parties through an alliance with the “capitalist parliamentary 
forces” against the “feudal monarchy”.30 It also passed 
a new program for working towards a democratic republic 
through a multiparty system – the line condemned 
as “revisionist” only a few months before. 
The upshot was that Prachanda accepted Bhattarai’s political 
line and Bhattarai accepted Prachanda’s primacy. The 
Chunbang meeting not only resolved the internal debate 
and restored Bhattarai to the leadership but also placed 
the Maoists much more firmly on a moderate path. It paved 
the way for the November 2005 twelve-point agreement 
 
 
29 See Crisis Group Asia Report, Nepal’s New Alliance, op. cit. 
30 Prachanda, press statement, 28 November 2005. 
with the SPA and the April 2006 mass movement. But 
the new line still had its critics. 
3. Teething troubles 
Most of the Maoist top leadership supported Prachanda’s 
case that the changed political context demanded a change 
in their own line. But some were deeply suspicious 
of accepting the multiparty system and did not back 
Bhattarai’s rehabilitation. Politburo member Rabindra 
Shrestha, who was close to Prachanda and wanted to expel 
Bhattarai from the party,31 took the dissidents’ case public. 
He was supported by Mani Dhwaj Thapa (Anukul), who 
shared similar dissatisfactions, albeit for different reasons.32
Shrestha and Thapa issued a joint statement on 13 March 
2006 calling on party cadres to rebel against Prachanda 
and Bhattarai. Prachanda wasted no time in expelling 
them from the party and denouncing them as “traitors”, 
“collaborators of the reactionaries” and “unnecessary by-
product of the revolution”.33 But their rebellion pointed 
to the difficulties of selling the new line throughout the 
Maoist movement. They offered two principal critiques: 
that Prachanda and Bhattarai’s “anti-proletarian weaknesses” 
had led to “emerging negative trends” within the party34 
and that the whole movement was being dragged into a 
“rightist deviation”. They rejected outright the proposition 
that multiparty competition should be viewed as a means 
of preventing counter-revolution.35
Shrestha and Thapa set up their own “New Cultural 
Revolution Group” but their call for revolt had little impact 
within the Maoist movement.36 Only one moderately senior 
activist, former alternative central committee member 
Tulasi Ojha (Anawarat) of Dhankuta, joined them; he was 
in any case already under disciplinary action.37 Shrestha 
and Thapa’s charge that their party was following a rightist 
deviation echoes the main complaint of non-Nepali Maoists, 
but their lack of organised support meant they could not 
win the backing of international allies. Ultimately their 
revolt undermined the suggestion that the Maoists’ new 
line was just a cosmetic gesture: it illustrated that however 
weak their commitment to multiparty politics might be, 
 
31 Crisis Group interview, CPN(M) central committee member, 
Kathmandu, December 2006. 
32 Anukul, a long-time Bhattarai supporter who had become 
frustrated with Maoist party politics, believed it would be better 
for Bhattarai to accept his expulsion and pursue his ideas with 
a new party. 
33 Prachanda, press statement, 14 March 2006. 
34 Rabindra Shrestha and Mani Thapa, press statement, 13 
March 2006. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Shrestha and Thapa published their documents in a blog, 
http://maobadi.wordpress.com. 
37 Anavarat, press statement, 2 May 2006. 
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the party’s leaders were engaged in a real debate over the 
course of their movement and were willing to face down 
internal opposition. 
C. THEIR CHANGED AGENDAS 
The Maoists’ original plan was that their people’s war 
would achieve “new democracy” (naulo janabad). This 
was to be a form of dictatorship of the proletariat similar 
to that established by the Chinese communists, which 
would give way to socialism and ultimately communism.38 
In this their primary targets were the parliamentary system 
and the monarchy. The course of the conflict and the 
changing political context persuaded them to make major 
revisions to this initial strategy. They have adopted three 
significant new policies: a constituent assembly, a 
democratic republic and a multiparty system. The only 
tenet they have not abandoned is that of republicanism. 
Constituent assembly. The Maoists had always demanded 
a new constitution but they did not initially call for a 
constituent assembly (CA).39 In February 2001, their 
second national conference decided “to increase the debate 
about the process of drawing up a people’s constitution” 
but implied that it would not be drafted by specially elected 
representatives.40 Still, when they entered talks soon 
afterwards, they demanded “interim government, CA 
election and institutional development of the republic”.41 
They saw the CA proposal as a means to drive a wedge 
between monarchists and republicans. They dropped the 
republican agenda temporarily during the negotiations 
when it failed to gain public support but they kept the 
CA agenda. The fact that it was not acceptable to the 
 
 
38 Their aim was “completing the new democratic revolution 
after the destruction of feudalism and imperialism, then 
immediately moving towards socialism, and, by way of cultural 
revolutions based on the theory of continuous revolution under 
the dictatorship of the proletariat, marching to communism – the 
golden future of the whole humanity”. “Theoretical Premises 
for the Historic Initiation of the People’s War”, in Some 
Important Documents of Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) 
(Kathmandu, 2004). For details, see Crisis Group Report, 
Nepal’s Maoists, op. cit. 
39 See Crisis Group Reports, Towards a Lasting Peace in Nepal, 
op. cit., pp. 24-25 and Nepal’s Constitutional Process, op. cit., 
p. 3. 
40 They called for multilateral talks, an all-party conference to 
form an interim government and a new constitution to be made 
by that government. Nepal kamyunist parti (maobadi) ko 
aitihasik dastavejharu, op. cit., p. 206.
41 Following the June 2001 palace massacre, in which King 
Birendra and almost his entire immediate family were killed, 
the Maoists claimed that a republic had automatically been born 
and should be institutionalised. Baburam Bhattarai, Monarchy 
vs. Democracy: The Epic Fight in Nepal (New Delhi, 2005), 
p. 17. 
palace or mainstream parties was one reason behind the 
failure of both the 2001 and 2003 talks. 
The February 2005 royal coup changed political 
calculations. It appeared to prove the weakness of the 
1990 dispensation and added to grassroots pressure 
within the mainstream parties to endorse constitutional 
change. For the Maoists, the CA proposal was a means 
for both moving from armed insurgency into mainstream 
politics and for restructuring the state.42 For both sides it 
became the most attractive option to end the conflict and 
move forward. 
Democratic republic. The October 2005 Chunbang 
meeting decided on the immediate goal of a multiparty 
democratic republic. This term is also acceptable to 
moderate parliamentary republicans but the concept holds 
a particular significance within the Maoists’ longer term 
strategy.43 Baburam Bhattarai defines it as a “transitional 
republic”, more progressive than an Indian-style 
“parliamentary republic” but still a step short of a “people’s 
republic”. According to him, it is the supreme phase of 
“capitalist democracy”, in which all elements of “formal 
democracy” (multiparty competition, voting rights, general 
elections, rule of law, press freedom and the like) will be 
accompanied by appropriate representation and participation 
of oppressed classes, castes, regions and women in state 
structures.44 The Maoists would join such a multiparty 
competitive system in order to try to establish a people’s 
republic peacefully through the electoral process.45
Multiparty system. The Maoists only accepted the 
concept of competitive multiparty politics in May 2003, 
when their central committee approved a proposal for 
“development of democracy in [the] 21st century”. While 
replacing the traditional concept of a one-party dictatorship 
of the proletariat, this only envisaged political competition 
among “anti-feudal” and “anti-imperialist” parties.46 None 
of the major mainstream parties would meet these criteria: 
Prachanda has defined the NC and NC(D) as “most 
reactionary parties” and the UML as a “revisionist party” 
 
42 Crisis Group interviews, Maoist leaders, Kathmandu, 
November 2006. 
43 The UML, Janamorcha and NWPP have signed up to the 
idea of a democratic republic but do not all define the term in 
the same way. 
44 For a detailed description of the Maoists’ concept of a 
democratic republic, see Baburam Bhattarai, Rajtantra ra 
loktantrik ganatantra (Kathmandu, 2006). 
45 Baburam Bhattarai, “Loktantrik ganatantrako gudi”, 
Mulyankan, June 2006. Prachanda also said the Maoists would 
“go for the goal of the people’s democracy through peaceful 
means”. Interview with The Hindu, op. cit. 
46 For the Maoists, royalist parties are “feudal” and pro-U.S. 
parties are “imperialist”. 
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with a “very dual” role.47 The Maoists recognise that they 
will not be able to restrict participation in a democratic 
republic but hope to implement their more narrowly defined 
system under a people’s republic. But they are coy when 
pressed on exactly how their proposed restrictions would 
apply to Nepal’s mainstream parties; Bhattarai only 
comments that “in every form of democracy there are 
rules on who can register as a political party – democracy 
does not mean freedom without limits”.48
There are two main reasons for the Maoists’ acceptance 
of multiparty democracy. First, they realised that they 
could not overturn domestic and international insistence 
that political competition is synonymous with democracy. 
Secondly, their conclusion that earlier communist regimes 
had failed due to the lack of political competition (see 
above) provided a compelling argument within their own 
strategic framework. To avoid the danger of revolutionary 
change decaying into bureaucratic stagnation, they decided 
that “a situation must be created to ensure continuous 
proletarisation and revolutionisation of the communist 
party by organizing political competition within the 
constitutional limits of the anti-feudal and anti-imperialist 
democratic state”.49
D. RESHAPING RELATIONS AT HOME AND 
ABROAD 
Once they had realised that they could not win on their 
own, the Maoists turned their attention to relations with 
other power centres, particularly the mainstream parties 
and India. In this they were partly guided by the classical 
Maoist tactics of the “united front”: to “unite with all 
forces that can be united with in order to fight a common 
struggle against the enemy and to win in revolution and 
construction”.50 This provided rationale enough for a 
tactical alliance with the parties, just as it could have been 
stretched to justify an alliance with the palace had the 
plan to unite on a nationalist basis materialised. 
 
 
47 Interview with Prachanda, Hamro Jaljala, September 2006. 
48 Crisis Group interview, April 2006. 
49 The CPN(M) has concluded that, “Only by institutionalising 
the rights of the masses to install an alternative revolutionary party 
or leadership on the state if the party fails to continuously 
revolutionise itself can counter-revolution be effectively 
checked”. “On the Experiences of History and Development of 
Democracy in the 21st Century”, document adopted by May 2003 
CPN(M) central committee meeting, at http://cpnm.org/new/ 
English/worker/9issue/document.htm. 
50 Kwok-Sing Li (tr. Mary Lok), A Glossary of Political Terms 
of the People’s Republic of China (Hong Kong, 1995), p. 451 
[emphasis added]. See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Maoists, 
op. cit, pp. 10-12. 
However, the bid to reshape relations with other domestic 
and international players was also framed with the possibility 
of abandoning the underground struggle in mind. Even 
those pushing for greater engagement with mainstream 
forces knew that any process of going above ground would 
be difficult and dangerous. Cultivating powerful allies 
could ease the transition and help the Maoists reposition 
themselves to make the most of open politics. The key 
domestic constituencies were the major parties and civil 
society groups, although they also maintained quiet 
contacts with the palace and the army. Maoist leaders 
made increasing efforts to present a new public face to the 
world through more moderate press interviews and to win 
over elements of the international community. 
The main thrust, though, revolved around the volte-face 
on relations with India. The August 2004 decision to 
confront “Indian expansionism” led to a campaign to dig 
trenches and bunkers across the country to prepare for a 
supposedly imminent “intervention”. But less than a year 
later they were courting New Delhi and, to their Indian 
allies’ even greater dismay, the Communist Party of India 
(Marxist) (CPM), which supported the Congress-led 
government and had long been fervently anti-Maoist.51 
India had tacitly maintained contacts with the Maoists and 
had its own interests in reciprocating their new attention. 
Apart from policymakers’ increasing frustration with 
King Gyanendra, some security analysts suggested that 
the CPN(M)’s joining mainstream politics would benefit 
regional stability and could provide a model for their 
Indian counterparts.52
The Maoists’ revised approach to India brought them some 
immediate benefits: it enabled the alliance with the 
SPA (whose top leaders had accepted Delhi’s informal 
mediation53); encouraged India’s move away from the king; 
went a long way to neutralising steadfast U.S. opposition; 
brought a degree of international legitimacy; and led to the 
release of more than 100 activists (including senior leaders 
Kiran and Gaurav) from Indian prisons. They believed, 
perhaps correctly, that they and India could build on at 
least one shared interest: that their limited cooperation 
would reduce the U.S. influence that had raised hackles 
among both Maoists and Indian policy-makers. 
 
51 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s New Alliance, op. cit. 
52 Maoism is a growing domestic threat for the Indian authorities. 
On 4 November 2004, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh 
described it as “an even greater threat to India than militancy in 
Jammu and Kashmir and the Northeast”. According to one study, 
Maoist violence affects at least 165 districts across fourteen 
Indian states, more than one quarter of its area. See “Maoist 
Assessment - Year 2006”, www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/ 
india/maoist/Assessment/index.html. 
53 Crisis Group interviews, SPA leaders, Kathmandu, November 
2006. 
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III. CRITICAL COMRADES 
The Maoists had solid backing from international allies 
when they launched their campaign. Organisations such 
as the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM) 
came to see them as the global standard-bearer of old-
fashioned Maoism. But as Nepal’s Maoists moved away 
from their initially traditional strategy, they faced criticism 
from international supporters who could not accept their 
line of peaceful transition. They have had difficulty in 
selling their new line but they are ambitious: they believe 
that their experiment in compromise can set a new 
precedent for the global left. 
Indian Maoists are the CPN(M)’s most immediate and 
influential allies, although their practical support has been 
low-level and not critical to sustaining the insurgency. 
Their sceptical stance towards the peace process is relevant 
insofar as it shows the distance the CPN(M) leadership 
has travelled from its original strategy and reflects unease 
that is only just starting to find a voice among Nepali 
Maoists themselves. Indian Maoist leader Ganapathy has 
warned that his comrades across the border must “either 
get co-opted into the system or abandon the present policy 
of power-sharing with the ruling classes and continue armed 
revolution to seize power. There is no Buddhist middle 
way. They cannot set the rules for a game the bourgeoisie 
had invented”.54 This argument has resonance across the 
revolutionary left – for Nepal’s Maoists to succeed, they 
must not only overcome their parliamentary foes but win 
over the critics in their own camp. 
A. INTERNATIONAL ALLIES 
Two groups have been particularly important in providing 
international backing for the Maoists: 
Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM). RIM 
sees itself as the guardian of Marxism-Leninism and 
Maoism’s guiding principles. It was established in 1984 
by groups in China wishing to protect Mao’s legacy from 
counter-revolution following his death. Its official contact 
office in London is no more than a postal address but it 
brings out irregularly the magazine A World to Win and 
fosters contacts between Maoist groups from different 
countries. The CPN(M) is the only RIM member whose 
talk of revolution has been seriously put into practice.55 
 
 
 
54 Tilak Pokharel, “Indian Maoists urge CPN-M to wield arms”, 
The Kathmandu Post, 16 May 2006. 
55 RIM’s members are: Ceylon Communist Party (Maoist), 
Communist Party of Afghanistan, Communist Party of 
Bangladesh (Marxist-Leninist), Communist Party of Nepal 
(Maoist), Communist Party of Peru, Communist Party of Turkey 
Nepal became a shining example for other Maoists, who 
glorified it as a successful demonstration of contemporary 
revolution. Adjusting to the CPN(M)’s redefined position 
has been difficult. 
RIM played an important role in encouraging the Maoists 
to go ahead with their people’s war strategy. In 1993 (the 
year of Mao’s centenary), it declared that it followed 
“Maoism” rather than “Mao Zedong thought”, a 
controversial line that the CPN (Unity Centre) backed in 
its “Mao Memorial”.56 One faction of the Unity Centre 
went on to become the CPN(M), including “Maoist” in its 
name to show allegiance to this position.57 (The CPN 
(Masal) led by Mohan Bikram Singh was also a member 
of RIM but it refused to accept the Maoist line and left 
the organisation in 1998.) RIM welcomed the start of 
the people’s war in Nepal with a communiqué entitled 
“From the Andes to the Himalayas, people’s war is the 
only way to liberation”.58 It then worked to generate 
international support for Nepal’s Maoists by building an 
international profile and developing links in other countries. 
According to Prachanda, there was “consistent international 
involvement” in the final stages of planning the people’s 
war, “first and foremost” with the RIM Committee:59 “There 
was important ideological and political exchange. From 
the RIM Committee, we got the experience of the PCP 
(Communist Party of Peru), the two-line struggle there, 
and also the experience in Turkey, the experience in Iran 
and the experience in the Philippines. We learned from 
the experience in Bangladesh and from some experience 
in Sri Lanka”.60 RIM also drove the establishment of the 
World People’s Resistance Movement (WPRM), which 
aims to organise communists and non-communists against 
“American imperialism”.61 WPRM came to focus much 
of its attention on Nepal, running frequent propaganda 
 
Marxist-Leninist, Marxist-Leninist Communist Organisation of 
Tunisia, Maoist Communist Party [Italy], Marxist-Leninist 
Communist Organisation of Tunisia, Proletarian Party of Purba 
Bangla [Bangladesh], Revolutionary Communist Group 
of Colombia, Revolutionary Communist Party [U.S.] and 
Communist Party of Iran (Marxist-Leninist-Maoist). See 
www.awtw.org/rim/index.htm.
56 “Mao smarika” (CPN (Unity Centre) central office, December 
1993). Even the Chinese Communist Party does not use the term 
“Maoism”, as it does not believe that Mao’s thought constitutes 
a complete ideology in itself. 
57 This issue was one of the disagreements leading to the CPN 
(Unity Centre)’s split in 1994. The faction that did not join the 
CPN(M) still adheres to “Mao Zedong thought” rather than 
“Maoism”. 
58 RIM Committee, press statement, 1 May 1996. 
59 Li Onesto, “Red Flag Flying on Roof of the World” (interview 
with Prachanda), Revolutionary Worker, 20 February 2000. 
60 Ibid. 
61 See www.wprm.org. 
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and publicity programs in European cities.62 Since 
November 2005 it has sent three groups of foreign 
volunteers to work on a Maoist road-building project in 
Rolpa district.63 WPRM also has a South Asia branch;64 its 
current coordinator is CPN(M) leader Suresh Ale Magar. 
Coordinating Committee of Maoist Parties and 
Organisations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA). This 
committee was formed in July 2001 by nine Maoist outfits 
from India, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka, formalising 
a previously loose relationship.65 The CPN(M) was a major 
force behind its formation, and Nepali Maoists have played 
a significant role in its leadership.66 This regional coming 
together helped smooth the path for the September 2004 
unification of India’s two major Naxalite organisations 
– the CPI-ML(PW) and the MCC-I – as the Communist 
Party of India (Maoist).67 That merger went some way 
towards reuniting a movement that has been divided since 
Naxalite leader Charu Mazumdar’s 1972 death, although 
the mainstream CPI-ML (Liberation) is one of a number 
of Naxalite groups that is resolutely opposed to the armed 
struggle endorsed by the CPI (Maoist). 
CCOMPOSA helped the CPN(M) expand its South Asian 
contacts and form cooperative relationships with other 
like-minded groups. Nepal’s Maoists had already developed 
a regional perspective with their February 2001 national 
conference resolution on “a new Soviet federation for South 
Asia”.68 The conference concluded that India was the major 
 
 
62 Crisis Group interviews, WPRM activists, London, Frankfurt 
and Brussels, January, February and October 2005. 
63 “Nepal: building a road into the future. Provisional report of 
the First International Road Building Brigade to the Magarat 
autonomous republic of Nepal”, at www.pcr-rcpcanada.org. 
64 This was established by Nepali, Indian, Bangladeshi and Sri 
Lankan representatives at a secret meeting held on 2–4 October 
2002 somewhere in South Asia. Interview with “Com Munir”, 
convenor of WPRM South Asia, at www.wprm.org/wprm_sa/ 
wprm_sa/interview_sa.htm. 
65 Sudheer Sharma, “Deep Red in the Heartland”, Himal South 
Asian, January 2002. CCOMPOSA’s founding members were: 
Communist Party of India-Marxist Leninist (People’s War) 
(CPI-ML(PW),commonly known as the People’s War Group 
or PWG), Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCC-I), 
Revolutionary Communist Centre of India (Maoist), 
Revolutionary Communist Centre of India (MLM), Bangladesher 
Samyabadi Dal (M-L), Purbo Bangla Sarbahara Party (CC), 
Purbo Bangla Sarbahara Party (MPK), Ceylon Communist 
Party (Maoist) and Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist). 
66 Crisis Group interviews, RIM sources, London, January 2005. 
67 Nihar Nayak, “Naxalites: A Compact of Fire”, South Asia 
Intelligence Review, 18 October 2004. See also “Top Naxals 
pledge no action during truce”, The Hindu, 15 October 2004. 
“Naxalite” is the name normally given to Indian Maoists; it refers 
to the village of Naxalbari in India’s West Bengal (on the Nepal 
border), which was the cradle of a late-1960s Maoist uprising. 
68 Prachanda, Mahan agragami chhalang, op. cit., p. 24. 
obstacle to any regional popular revolution, so any 
successful insurgency would eventually have to fight with 
India. This justified building a stronger common front 
between otherwise disparate national groups, hence 
CCOMPOSA’s twin aims of “struggling for the 
achievement of people’s power in one’s own country” 
and “fighting against American imperialism and Indian 
expansionism”.69
B. IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES 
Most RIM and CCOMPOSA members have been very 
sceptical about the CPN(M)’s strategic review. Some have 
aired their criticisms publicly; others have expressed doubts 
privately. The debate is not hostile but it has sometimes 
been bad-tempered, and several rounds of meetings have 
yet to bridge differences. Nepal’s Maoists insist they are 
viewing their international friends’ objections as constructive 
criticism but there has been some trading of snide comments 
and harsh words. 
The main difference between Nepal’s Maoists and their 
international allies is over how to put ideology into practice. 
The CPN(M) has concluded that revolution cannot be 
achieved by classical strategy and tactics; Prachanda has 
coined a new mantra: “the repetition of revolution is 
impossible, only its development is possible”.70 This 
explains their departure from the established formulas of 
Marxism, Leninism and Maoism and justifies their attempt 
to develop a new approach suited to contemporary Nepal. 
Most of their international allies see this as revisionism 
– a harsh charge among communists.71 Indian Maoist 
leaders complain that the CPN(M) makes dramatic tactical 
shifts without consultation and employs a confusing mix 
of strategy and tactics.72 But for Nepali Maoists, their 
foreign comrades are “dogmatic” and do not understand 
 
69 CCOMPOSA, press statement, 24 September 2001. The 
call for the creation of a new Soviet-style federation in South 
Asia was a controversial policy, criticised by other leftists as 
counterproductive and likely only to increase India’s expansionist 
ambitions as a regional power. Interview with UML General 
Secretary Madhav Kumar Nepal, Dishabodh, April 2001. 
70 “Aitihasik sambhavana ra aitihasik chunauti”, Sanshleshan, 
October 2006. 
71 Crisis Group interview, Maoist leader, Kathmandu, November 
2006. 
72 CPI (Maoist) General Secretary Ganapathy expressed his 
concerns to a CPN(M) cadre: “While it is a good thing that your 
party has been taking up tactics quite boldly, there is also the 
problem of oversimplification of some situations and, at times, 
taking tactics based on an overestimation of the situation such 
as the intensity of the contradictions between India, China and 
the U.S.”. “South Asia is indeed becoming a storm centre of 
world revolution”, interview with CPI (Maoist) General Secretary 
Ganpathy by a CPN(M) associate, mid-2006, made available 
to Crisis Group by email. 
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Nepal’s reality. A senior CPN(M) leader observed: “We 
have reached the counter-offensive phase, while our Indian 
friends are still struggling on the defensive phase; how 
can they understand the challenges that we are facing?”73
Policy wrangles with RIM date from the CPN(M)’s May 
2003 adoption of DDTC.74 Here the main clash is with 
the U.S. Revolutionary Communist Party, which has 
traditionally dominated RIM. However, differences and 
debates with Indian Maoists, mainly represented by the 
CPI (Maoist), are more significant, not least because 
of their geographic proximity and their decades-long 
bilateral relations. Indian Maoists have bridled at their 
Nepali counterparts’ arrogance and the development of 
Prachandapath and its promotion as a near-sovereign 
ideology. CPI (Maoist) General Secretary Ganapathy 
offers a typical put-down: “We found that there is a certain 
degree of over generalisation with regard to some of 
the achievements of the people’s war in Nepal, such as 
attributing universality to some things that are basically 
a feature of the revolution in an extremely backward 
country.”75
The CPI (Maoist) is the only fraternal party to have 
continuously and openly criticised the CPN(M)’s new line. 
(The relationship between Nepali and Indian Maoists 
has always been rocky, featuring a number of policy 
disagreements.76) When Nepal’s Maoists signed the 
 
 
73 Crisis Group interview, Maoist leader, Kathmandu, November 
2006. 
74 Crisis Group interview, Maoist leader, Kathmandu, November 
2006. 
75 “South Asia is indeed becoming a storm centre of world 
revolution”, op. cit. 
76 When Nepali Maoists participated in the 1991 general election 
and became the third largest parliamentary party, Indian Maoists 
accused them of rightist deviation. Crisis Group interview, 
Nepali Maoist leader, Kathmandu, November 2006. When they 
launched their people’s war they were applauded by some 
colleagues across the border but others warned they had misread 
the situation and the insurgency was doomed to failure. The 
CPN(M) vigorously fought its case, Prachanda complaining 
that India’s Maoist movement had “no vision”: “Some groups 
say guerrilla zone, guerrilla zone, guerrilla zone. For 25 years 
they say guerrilla zone, but there is not any perspective, real 
perspective”. Li Onesto, “Red Flag Flying on Roof of the 
World”, op. cit. Shortly afterwards, representatives from both 
sides of the border patched up their differences. “The people of 
both countries, led by their Maoist parties, have been heroically 
fighting back the state offensive, and are advancing towards 
genuine liberation and freedom…it is the genuine Maoist 
revolutionary forces who are leading the people’s war for total 
emancipation”. CPN(M) and CPI-ML(PW), joint press statement, 
14 July 2000. Arguments broke out again over the CPN(M)’s 
willingness to engage in peace talks in 2001 and 2003. But 
following the return to war, the CPN(M) helped mediate the 
unification of India’s two largest Maoist groups – the CPI-
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) with the 
government, CPI (Maoist) Spokesman “Comrade Azad” 
reacted: “We appeal to the CPN(M) once again to rethink 
about their current tactics which are actually changing the 
very strategic direction of the revolution in Nepal”.77 He 
warned that they ran the risk of falling into “traps laid by 
the ruling classes and their imperialist and expansionist 
masters” or falling victim to “a sudden coup and massacre 
of communists as witnessed in Greece, Indonesia, Chile 
and a number of other countries”.78  
C. THE ALLIES’ OBJECTIONS 
The Indian Maoists’ objections fall broadly into strategic 
and tactical categories (although a longstanding complaint 
is that Nepal’s Maoists conflate strategy and tactics). 
1. On strategy 
The CPA. The hardest compromise for the Indian Maoists 
to digest has been the CPN(M)’s declaration, through the 
CPA, that it has ended its war. The CPI (Maoist) complains 
that “the agreement by the Maoists to become part of 
the interim government in Nepal cannot transform the 
reactionary character of the state machinery that serves 
the exploiting ruling classes and imperialists”.79
The CA. The CPI (Maoist) believes the CA agenda is 
only suitable for tactical propaganda, not for serious 
implementation; it publicly objected when the CPN(M) 
signed the twelve-point agreement with the SPA.80 CPI 
(Maoist) leaders warn that accepting the CA and a 
multiparty system will lure the CPN(M) into parliamentary 
politics and make it little more than a second UML. They 
think it is wrong “to expect a possibility of a peaceful 
transition from the CA to the new democratic revolution”.81 
Spokesman Azad cautioned that “one may bring some 
reforms from above and satisfy certain deprived sections 
of the people but it will never solve the basic problems 
of the people as you cannot smash feudalism and throw 
out imperialism from the soil of Nepal by utilising the old 
state whatever embellishments one might do to give it 
a refurbished image”.82
 
ML(PW) and the MCC-I – as the CPI (Maoist) in September 
2004. 
77 Azad (CPI (Maoist) spokesman), press statement, 13 
November 2006. 
78 Interview with Azad, People’s March (unofficial mouthpiece 
of CPI (Maoist)), 6 August 2006, at http://peoplesmarch. 
wordpress.com. 
79 Azad, press statement, 13 November 2006. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Interview with Azad, People’s March, op. cit. 
82 Ibid. 
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Development of Democracy in Twenty-first Century 
(DDTC). The CPN(M)’s bold abandonment of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat in favour of DDTC met with 
a cool reception. “What is new in the concept of 21st 
century democracy raised by the CPN(M) and how is it 
qualitatively different from the democracy of the twentieth 
century (communism)?”, asked Azad.83 Indian Maoists 
worry that DDTC is vague on the concept of political 
competition, not clarifying whether it is applicable after 
seizing power or during the revolutionary process. They 
strongly oppose a general commitment to multiparty 
politics. The CPI (Maoist) supports neither the new phase 
of democratic republic nor the idea of a people’s republic 
diluted by political competition. 
2. On tactics 
Dissolving the “people's regime”. Indian Maoists consider 
the “people’s governments” and “people’s courts” a major 
achievement and fear their dissolution will lead to “an 
irreversible process of losing all the revolutionary gains 
achieved till now”.84
Cantoning the PLA. Indian Maoists called on their Nepali 
comrades “to withdraw from their agreement with the 
government of Nepal on depositing arms of PLA [the 
Maoist People’s Liberation Army] as this would make the 
people defenceless in face of attacks by the reactionaries”.85 
They criticise the proposed merger of the PLA and 
Nepalese Army into a new national army as “even more 
dangerous”: “By merging the people’s army with the 
reactionary army of the ruling classes (until now the 
faithful servant of the king), the people will become 
defenceless in case of a reactionary armed offensive by 
the enemy”.86
Inviting in the UN. Indian Maoists objected to the UN’s 
role in supervising the arms management process. They 
say it is not neutral but “essentially an instrument of 
imperialism and particularly American imperialism”.87
Relations with the Indian establishment. The Indian 
Maoists are particularly affronted by their Nepali 
counterparts’ wooing of the Indian government and the 
 
 
83 Ibid. He offers his own answer: “We are still not clear what 
is this new concept and qualitative leap claimed by CPN(M) 
except for their line of multiparty democracy and political 
competition, which boils down to competing peacefully with the 
various reactionary and revisionist parties for power in a so-called 
transitional multiparty democratic republic”. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Azad, press statement, 13 November 2006. 
86 Interview with Azad, People’s March, op. cit. 
87 Ibid. 
mainstream CPM.88 On his first formal visit to India, in 
November 2006, Prachanda reassured Delhi’s political elite 
that “India is no more a reactionary state” and declared: “We 
have no working relations with the Indian Maoists, but only 
ideological relations”.89 For their Indian comrades, the 
Maoists’ burgeoning relations with the CPM were the 
hardest to swallow. The CPM, which backs the Congress-
led government, has long been hostile towards Maoists, 
who in turn consider it a “reactionary party”. 
Model for Naxalites. The CPM’s suggestion that Nepal’s 
Maoists are an example of peaceful transition that their 
Indian counterparts should emulate met with an even frostier 
reaction.90 Nepali Maoists also urged the Indian Maoists 
“to reconsider their revolutionary strategies and to practice 
multiparty democracy” and claimed “their current tactics 
in Nepal would be an example”.91 When an interviewer 
asked, “to what extent do you think the logic of your line 
on multiparty democracy applies also to the Maoist 
movements in India?”, Prachanda replied, “we believe it 
applies to them too…They have to understand this and 
go down this route”.92
3. Conflict or compromise? 
These disagreements led to strained relations between 
Maoists on either side of the Nepal-India border. Coming 
on top of their other differences, the CPI (Maoist) found 
Prachanda’s call for it to follow the CPN(M) route “even 
more surprising”,93 and it formally objected.94 The CPN(M) 
responded one week later, asking their comrades to 
understand the difference between “theoretical-political” 
and “diplomatic” expressions and proposing a bilateral 
meeting for detailed discussion. But in a further letter, the 
CPI (Maoist) complained that the Nepali Maoists should 
have offered a public self-criticism over their “negative” 
and “provocative” comments on their Indian comrades.95
 
88 Crisis Group interview, Nepali Maoist leader, Kathmandu, 
November 2006. 
89 Nilova Roy Chaudhury, “We have no working relation 
with Indian Maoists”, Hindustan Times, 18 November 2006. 
90 CPI (Maoist) spokesperson Azad warns that “[CPI (Marxist) 
leader] Sitaram Yechury has particularly sought to pit the Nepal 
Maoists against the Indian Maoists. While the CPI (Marxist) 
brutally suppresses the Maoists in West Bengal, it is 
hypocritically speaking in praise of the Nepal Maoists”. Azad, 
“Maoists in India, a rejoinder”, Economic and Political Weekly, 
14 October 2006. 
91 Azad, press statement, 13 November 2006. 
92 Interview with The Hindu, op. cit. 
93 Azad, press statement, 13 November 2006. 
94 This objection was contained in a 16 February 2006 letter sent 
by the CPI (Maoist)’s international department. Crisis Group 
interviews, Maoist leaders, Kathmandu, November 2006. 
95 Crisis Group interviews, Maoist leaders, Kathmandu, 
November 2006. 
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CCOMPOSA’s August 2006 fourth conference, held in 
Nepal, offered a chance for Indian and Nepali Maoists to 
talk over their differences. The Indian Maoists admitted 
that their spokesman Azad had spoken “too much” in 
public interviews without consulting his Nepali comrades.96 
In an attempt to rein in the embarrassingly public war of 
words, the parties issued a joint press statement affirming 
that “all tactical questions … being adopted in the 
respective countries are the sole concern of the parties 
operating there.…We shall continue debates on ideological, 
political and strategic issues on which we differ in the true 
democratic traditions of the international communist 
movement. These debates and discussions will take place 
bilaterally and, occasionally, publicly.”97
During the bilateral meetings, Indian Maoists frequently 
suggested the CPN(M) consider two “revolutionary 
options”. Ideally they should intensify work towards 
a mass uprising to capture central power. If that is not 
possible, they should consolidate their base areas and move 
towards Kathmandu gradually by capturing territory.98 
The CPN(M) rejected both options, arguing that they 
should first try for peaceful change through the CA and 
only if that fails revert to mass movement tactics.99 In their 
rejection of the classic people’s war strategy and new 
focus on urban demonstrations coupled with participation 
in government, the Nepali Maoists have clearly broken 
with their comrades’ vision. Although they have reached 
a temporary truce, many of their cross-border colleagues 
would welcome the failure of the revised strategy and 
would probably use any setbacks to press for a return to 
the traditional line. 
 
96 Crisis Group interview, CPN(M) leader who participated 
in CCOMPOSA conference, Kathmandu, November 2006. 
97 Azad and Satya (CPN(M) representative), press statement, 8 
August 2006. 
98 Crisis Group interview, Maoist leader involved in talks with 
CPI (Maoist) representatives, Kathmandu, December 2006. 
99 Ibid. 
IV. THE END OF PEOPLE’S WAR? 
The Maoists have manoeuvred themselves into a share in 
government. This has caused consternation among their 
determined opponents, who complain that they have 
outwitted the SPA on every front and stand poised for 
power. However, from the Maoist leaders’ perspective 
things do not look so rosy. They have had to make major 
concessions, they worry that they may have wasted the 
leverage they hoped to gain from their military capacity 
(by going into cantonments before securing any of their 
objectives), they fear most other political forces (from the 
UML through to the NC, the palace and foreign states, 
including India) are working to stall real change and freeze 
them out of meaningful power, and they will have a tough 
job keeping their cadres happy and persuading them they 
have made the right decisions. 
A. THE BALANCE SHEET 
1. Gains 
In 1996 the Maoists were a small, fringe party with no 
weapons, few active members and a support base limited 
to a few pockets of the remote countryside. Their ten-year 
armed insurgency transformed them into a powerful 
political force capable of standing alongside, and sometimes 
overshadowing, Nepal’s major, established parties. Although 
they have joined a coalition government within the 
framework of the peace process, they have retained, and 
partially legitimised, their own armed force while expanding 
their openings for building urban support. In terms of their 
original strategy, they are still pursuing the second plan 
of the people’s war counter-offensive phase and targeting 
a democratic republic as their immediate goal. 
The Maoists point to several achievements from their ten-
year, people’s war campaign: 
Ending the old system. The major achievement has been 
requiring all the political forces to accept that the 1990 
dispensation was defunct, and a new constitution and 
system were needed. So far, this victory is largely confined 
to paper but most major parties have made serious 
commitments to significant changes. The Maoists believe 
their movement can take credit for making republicanism 
a mass demand and for boosting Nepalis’ political 
consciousness and attention to demands that had previously 
been sidelined. They see this “progressive awareness” 
as their greatest strength, not an historical achievement 
but a basis for future mass mobilisation.100
 
 
100 Crisis Group interview, Maoist leader, Kathmandu, November 
2006. 
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Political and organisational capacity. The CPN(M) has 
become a broad-based, active and militant organisation. 
In its nationwide reach, political determination and 
organisational capacity (not to mention its military base), it 
probably outshadows all other parties. It has developed 
into a fairly mature, cadre-based political-military party, 
with experience of war and open politics. Despite its 
internal debates, the central committee lays down an 
unambiguous political line and disseminates it through 
a well-structured network, from the central commands 
and regional bureaus down to district, area and cell 
committees. As a party, it generally enjoys clarity, discipline 
and dedication, characteristics that could serve it well if 
it does become a committed, mainstream player. 
Armed force. The war’s most visible achievement was 
the conversion of a rag-tag guerrilla force into the 
formidable PLA. Although its strength on paper (more 
than 30,000 troops in seven divisions and over twenty 
brigades) is exaggerated, its ability to confront a much 
larger state army has been well demonstrated. The Maoists 
have placed the PLA in cantonments under the terms of the 
CPA but organisationally it remains intact and accepting the 
UN-supervised process has earned it a form of legitimacy. 
Parallel governance. As the war progressed, the Maoists 
became the de facto rulers of most of Nepal. They neither 
aimed for, nor achieved, unchallenged territorial control 
but made the most of the state’s absence.101 In the vacuum 
left by local government’s collapse or flight, they formed 
parallel “people’s governments” from central to region, 
district, village and ward level. Like their “base areas”, 
these existed more in theory than in practice: it was not 
such a great sacrifice to dissolve them under the CPA. 
But the local influence they represented is something the 
Maoists are determined not to throw away. They continue 
to pursue the ends of parallel governance through other 
means, using tools such as regional and ethnic liberation 
fronts, Young Communist League cadres and the leverage 
in open politics brought by their entry into government. 
The Maoists have also benefited from their transition into 
mainstream politics. The alliance with the SPA saved them 
from a potentially sapping stalemate, and their coming 
above ground after the April 2006 movement helped them 
consolidate earlier achievements and extend their reach. 
Apart from their new legitimacy, they have a better chance 
of addressing some of their chronic shortcomings, such 
as weak urban penetration and a poor trade union base. 
 
 
101 The Maoists announced they had created three types of “base 
area” (permanent, semi-permanent and temporary) but in 
fact they never secured any permanent base areas, as the RNA 
proved by entering their heartland on occasion – a provocation 
the Maoists met with tactical retreat rather than armed defence. 
Their five cabinet ministers and six dozen lawmakers102 
give them a foothold in the state alongside other political 
parties. Although they failed to win control of the most 
powerful ministries, they carefully selected their consolation 
prizes, choosing ministries which increase their influence 
in critical areas: Information and Communications Minister 
Krishna Bahadur Mahara is now the government 
spokesperson; having performed the same role for his party, 
he can make the most of the state-owned media under his 
control.103 Local Development Minister Dev Gurung 
directs the urban, district and village-level bodies that 
implement development projects and distribute budgets. 
Forest Minister Matrika Yadav controls a key public 
resource and oversees the important network of thousands 
of community forest users groups. Hisila Yami is in charge 
of housing and physical planning, while Khadga Bahadur 
Biswakarma oversees NGOs and INGOs – both positions 
which offer significant influence.104
2. But no revolution 
Despite these achievements, the Maoists have been forced 
into serious concessions. A critique from a classical 
communist perspective suggests they have submitted to 
mainstream politics without making substantial gains.105 
They have gone back on their original boast that they 
would capture central power single-handedly, and they 
have not even secured a leading position among the 
political forces after the April 2006 mass movement. As 
the “eighth party”, they are only one partner among many 
in the interim legislature and in a government headed 
by a non-communist prime minister. Maoist leaders 
acknowledge they have been forced into significant 
compromises.106
 
102 The Maoists’ 73 seats in the 329-member interim legislature 
puts them on a par with the UML. They were also allowed to 
nominate ten further members; unlike the other parties, they did 
not allocate these position to their own members but gave them 
to sympathisers who do not have to follow the CPN(M) whip. See 
Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Constitutional Process, op. cit. 
103 As well as regulating the independent media, the state runs 
its own daily newspapers, radio and TV stations. Mahara has 
experience in this area, gained as Maoist spokesman, as do 
numerous Maoist journalists and propagandists. Maheshwar 
Dahal, coordinator of the Revolutionary Journalists Association 
and former editor of Maoist mouthpiece Janadesh, has been 
appointed Mahara’s media adviser; pro-Maoist writer Rishiraj 
Baral is the new chairman of Nepal Television. On taking office 
Mahara promptly appointed loyal Maoists to replace the editorial 
team of Ghatna ra Bichar, a popular Radio Nepal current affairs 
program. 
104 On the Maoists’ behaviour in government, see below. 
105 Rabindra Shrestha, “Maoko topi, Prachandako jutta”, Jana 
Aastha, 10 June 2007. 
106 Crisis Group interview, Maoist leader, Kathmandu, December 
2006. 
Nepal’s Maoists: Purists or Pragmatists? 
Crisis Group Asia Report N°132, 18 May 2007 Page 14 
 
 
 
 
They ended their war without securing either their short-
term objective of an all-party roundtable or their longer-
term goal of a republic. Instead of moving quickly into 
government, they lost months and used up much bargaining 
power haggling over the terms of their entry into the interim 
government. The interim constitution is similarly silent on 
many of their major aims – although it includes promises 
for land reform, it does not address the higher priorities 
of federalism and a restructured military. 
Maoist leaders could earlier boast to their followers that 
their “new regime” had forced the “old regime” into 
negotiations but however much they seek to retain 
independent local influence, their assimilation into the 
state is slowly undermining their former independence. 
Their “people’s governments” and “people’s courts” 
(which were popular with many for producing rough but 
quick justice) have gone; in their place the Maoists have to 
justify efforts to reform the “old” bureaucracy, judiciary 
and security forces from within. 
The Maoists’ original plan, reflected in the November 2005 
agreement with the mainstream parties, was that their 
PLA and the state’s army would be of equal status and 
equally subject to UN supervision. However, they have 
had to accept that the arms management process is primarily 
targeted at their forces: most of the old RNA (now known 
as just the NA) is not under supervision,107 nor has its 
monopoly on providing security to the state been challenged. 
Maoist ministers have accepted army bodyguards – a 
welcome sign of growing confidence but also a sign of 
their weakness at the negotiating table. Similarly, they did 
not secure the dominant role in government they had hoped 
for. There had been a private agreement with the SPA that 
they would be offered the deputy prime ministership. In 
the end, they were forced to be satisfied with relatively 
junior ministries, while NC and UML dominated the major 
positions. (There is some advantage in this marginal 
participation in government: should the interim 
administration become unpopular, the Maoists will find 
it easier to escape the blame for its failures.) 
According to Prachanda, their “revolution” is at a half-
way point: they have achieved almost 60 per cent of their 
goals; the remaining 40 per cent will be come in the near 
future with election of the CA.108 If a republican system is 
not established, however, it will be hard for the Maoists 
to prove the decade of violence was worthwhile. 
 
 
107 The CPA specified only that the NA should place under 
supervision a number of troops and weapons similar to the 
Maoist total. 
108 Interview with Prachanda, L’espresso, November 2006, at 
www.espresso.repubblica.it/dettaglio/Prachanda:%20Our%20 
Revolution%20Won/1431107, republished in www.blog.com.np/ 
united-we-blog/2006/11/10/.  
B. NEW ROADMAP(S) 
For the Maoists, the current interim period is a transitional 
phase to destroy the “old mechanism” and to build a new 
state structure through the CA constitution-making 
process.109 If this succeeds, they will declare the “peaceful 
revolution” a victory for their new strategy.110 But if the 
process is derailed, they will try to lead a more traditional 
“revolution” in the form of a mass insurrection.111 The one 
option that is not on the table is a return to full-scale 
insurgency. While the Maoists retain the capacity to go 
back to war (and could easily retrieve their weapons from 
UN supervision if they chose), few leaders want a return 
to the unproductive military stalemate they have already 
experienced. Most would prefer to have their cake and to 
eat it: to keep a foothold in government and enjoy the 
benefits of open politics and better relations with other 
forces, while also using the weapon of street pressure. 
This balance is difficult to envisage in theory and may be 
even harder to achieve in practice. 
The Maoists had hoped that the April 2006 movement 
would establish a democratic republic immediately, leaving 
the CA for later, but the restoration of the old parliament 
blocked this plan.112 To this extent, the push to establish 
a democratic republic through the CA is already a fallback 
option. The tension between negotiation and insurrection 
has been a feature of all policy debates within the CPN(M) 
since April 2006. One month after the mass movement, 
the central committee approved two alternative tactical 
plans: peace talks or revolt. They formulated a ten-point 
roadmap for peace talks113 but also drew up a rough plan 
for mass insurrection named, with a nod to Lenin, the 
“April thesis”.114 The talks roadmap was published; the 
thesis was a (not very well kept) secret. 
Initially, the first option appeared to be working. Confident 
the CA would vote for a republic, the Maoists restructured 
their party organisation to focus on electoral 
 
109 Interview with Prachanda, L’espresso, op. cit. 
110 Crisis Group interviews, Maoist leaders, Kathmandu, 
November 2006. 
111 Ibid. 
112 The Maoists blamed this on “a grand design of some 
international power centres”, arguing that parliament was restored 
to rescue the king. Prachanda, press statement, 25 April 2006. 
113 For detail, see Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Peace Agreement, 
op. cit., p.6. 
114 Crisis Group interviews, Maoist central leaders, Kathmandu, 
November 2006. The title “April thesis” reflects the Maoists’ 
ambition: it deliberately recalls Lenin’s famous “April theses” 
published in the build-up to the October 1917 Russian revolution. 
(Lenin’s article, published in Pravda on 7 April 1917, was titled 
“The tasks of the proletariat in the present revolution”; it can be 
found at www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/apr/04.htm.) 
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constituencies.115 They believe they can be a strong force 
at the ballot box: they are a fresh face compared to the 
mainstream parties, have a popular agenda and an 
established organisational base. Prachanda has estimated 
they could win an outright majority.116 But when the 
peace talks lost momentum after the June 2006 eight-
point agreement, another central committee meeting 
concluded that preparation for revolt should take priority 
over negotiations. The leadership managed to hold the 
line when the peace process again moved forward but 
the alternative plan for revolt is alive and well, with some 
of its committed supporters increasingly restive. 
Whether through a peaceful constitutional process or 
insurrection, the Maoists are still committed to developing 
a new, Nepali revolutionary model and justifying their 
strategy in terms of their ideology. They hope to claim 
credit for the first successful communist revolution since 
the collapse of twentieth century communism and to export 
their “new ideology” around the world. They see a clear 
distinction between their commitment to respect political 
pluralism and the need to remodel their party on 
mainstream democratic lines. Despite building more 
cooperative relations with other parties, the Maoists have 
shown no interest in emulating their structure or way of 
working, which they still condemn as feudal and bourgeois. 
However much they have shifted strategy, they intend 
to retain ideological purity and will resist diluting their 
political culture. 
 
 
115 The three central “commands” were doubled in number, and 
fifteen regional bureaus were set up. The new commands 
are: Eastern (In-Charge Ram Bahadur Thapa (Badal)), Middle 
(Barshaman Pun (Ananta)), Western (Top Bahadur Rayamajhi), 
Mid-Western (Post Bahadur Bogati (Diwakar)), Far-Western 
(Netra Bikram Chand (Biplov)) and International (Chandra 
Prakash Gajurel (Gaurav)). The new regional bureaus are: Mechi 
(In-charge Gopal Kiranti), Koshi (Ram Karki), Sagarmatha-
Janakpur (Haribol Gajurel), Mithila (Matrika Yadav), Narayani 
(Kul Prasad K.C.), Kathmandu valley (Hitman Shakya), Bagmati 
(Agni Sapkota), Dhaulagiri (Devendra Poudel), Lumbini 
(Pampha Bhushal), Gandaki (Hitraj Pande), Rapti (Hemanta 
Prakash Oli), Bheri-Karnali (Shakti Basnet), Seti (Lekhraj 
Bhatta), Mahakali (Narayan Prasad Sharma) and India (Hari 
Bhakta Kandel). 
116 In Prachanda’s words, “I think the majority of the population 
will vote for us. More than 50 per cent should be for our party. 
In rural areas, according to our estimates, more than 80 per cent 
of the masses support our party. In urban areas and in the Terai 
there is a mixed situation. So now we are trying our best to win 
over population in urban areas and on the Terai’s plains. Anyway, 
I think that Maoist party will be supported by more than 50 
percent of the country. Overall the democratic, republican, 
radical and left forces will gain more than 75 per cent of the 
vote”. Interview with Prachanda, L’espresso, op. cit. 
C. A PHASED REVOLUTION 
The Maoists’ first goal is a democratic republic which 
provides space to restructure the state and move towards 
a people’s republic. With the establishment of a republic, 
they would focus on merging the NA and PLA into a new 
national army and implementing federalism. (Some of 
these goals have influenced the interim constitution, which 
in effect suspended the monarchy and moved away from 
defining Nepal as a unitary state.) Maoist leaders are 
confident that a democratic republican structure would help 
them to consolidate a powerful position.117 They believe 
they could secure the post of head of the state for themselves 
or an allied party; they could play to their strengths in 
addressing class, caste, region and gender-based issues; 
they could implement a federal system in line with their 
longstanding proposal;118 and they could ensure that a 
reformed national army would either be loyal to them or 
at least neutralised as a threat.119
According to the Maoists’ analysis, this would put them 
in a dominant position within the multiparty system.120 
They could then try to form a people’s republic, a Nepali 
version of Mao’s “new democracy”, preferably by 
amending the constitution or using other peaceful means, 
although they suspect some confrontation would be likely.121 
Under this system political competition would be much 
more restricted (see above); the Maoists would then aim 
to replace the “feudal production system” with their own 
type of “capitalist production system”.122 This would entail 
distributing the land of large landlords among the landless 
poor and nationalising industries owned by the “comprador 
bureaucratic capitalist classes”.123
 
117 Crisis Group interviews, Maoist leaders, Kathmandu, 
November 2006. 
118 Interview with Badal, Pratyakraman, September 2006. 
Federalism has become one of the defining features of the 
Maoists’ proposed democratic republic. Although anti-Maoist 
violence in the Tarai raised concerns that playing the ethnic card 
might be counterproductive, Maoist leaders have not abandoned 
their plans for federal units framed on ethnic lines and still hope 
to both capture and control the potentially powerful field of 
identity politics. 
119 Crisis Group interview, PLA division commander, December 
2006. 
120 Crisis Group interview, Maoist central committee member, 
Kathmandu, December 2006. 
121 Prachanda, “Naya nepalko ruprekha”, Nava Chetana, 
November 2006. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid. “Comprador”, as used in Mao’s analysis and, following 
from it, Nepali Maoist texts, refers to subservient domestic 
intermediaries or partners of foreign capital and governments 
who encourage the subordination of the national economy. 
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According to the DDTC plan, one section of the party 
leadership will go into government “to control, monitor 
and intervene” in the state while others will be responsible 
for party functioning.124 These groups may periodically 
rotate but the core leadership, including Prachanda, 
Baburam Bhattarai, Ram Bahadur Thapa (Badal) and 
Mohan Baidya (Kiran), would avoid involvement in day-
to-day government, instead instructing and monitoring 
the junior leaders whom they would deputise for the 
task.125 Nevertheless, Prachanda has not categorically ruled 
out the possibility of himself or other senior leaders going 
into government if needed. 
Like other parties, the Maoists promise a “new Nepal”. In 
Prachanda’s words, “with good government we can become 
one of the richest countries in South Asia. But we need 
transport, hi-tech and scientific projects, infrastructures, 
and a lot of courage. In ten years we’ll change the whole 
scenario, rebuilding this country to prosperity. In twenty 
years we could be similar to Switzerland”.126 The Maoists 
have outlined their development priorities as: (i) improving 
transportation with an east-west railway line and a new 
east-west highway through the hill districts, with north-
south links to the existing highway across the plains; 
(ii) boosting electricity generation with a mix of small 
hydro-power projects and larger schemes funded by “anti-
imperialist foreign investment”; and (iii) replacing private 
education with a free, state education system and expanding 
free health care.127 Maoists leaders say they believe in a 
mixed economy and will invite foreign investment under 
certain conditions.128
D. LEADERS OF THE RADICAL LEFT? 
Despite their quarrels, Nepal’s Maoists do not want to 
isolate themselves from their international allies. Rather, 
they want to pursue an ambitious goal of leading like-
minded radical groups around the world, an objective they 
made clear from the beginning: “The Nepalese revolution 
is an integral part of the world proletarian revolution, and 
this will serve the world revolution. In this conext our 
Party takes it as a serious responsibility to contribute 
towards the further development of RIM…and to create a 
New International”.129 This is one goal that they have 
 
 
124 “On the Experiences of History and Development of 
Democracy in the 21st Century”, op. cit. 
125 Crisis Group interviews, Maoist leaders, Kathmandu, 
November-December 2006. 
126 Interview with Prachanda, L’espresso, op. cit. 
127 Prachanda, “Naya nepalko ruprekha”, op. cit. 
128 Crisis Group interviews, Maoist leaders, Kathmandu, 
November 2006. 
129 “Theoretical Premises for the Historic Initiation of the 
People’s War”, op. cit. 
not dropped: Maoist leaders now talk about establishing 
a “Fourth International” from Nepal.130
In their quest to assume supremacy among revolutionary 
parties, they are considering two options. The first is 
to take over RIM’s leadership.131 They argue that this 
leadership should be from the “third world”, rather than 
being dominated by radical Western intellectuals, who 
have few followers and no effective organisations but 
still give instructions to those who are leading genuine 
armed struggles.132 They are particularly frustrated with 
the American Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP), 
which projects its chairman, Bob Avakian, as Mao’s 
successor though he has no real experience of revolution. 
The Nepali Maoists think that RIM should be based in 
South Asia and that Prachanda has earned the right to lead 
it.133
If they cannot win over RIM members with this argument, 
the CPN(M) may form a new organisation.134 With this 
goal in mind, it organised a five-day international seminar 
on “Imperialism and Proletarian Revolution in the 21st 
Century” in late December 2006.135 It was billed as part 
of the Nepali people’s war tenth anniversary celebrations, 
and it drew more than three dozen representatives from 
fourteen Maoist parties – perhaps the most significant 
gathering since the formation of RIM in 1984.136 Nepali 
and Indian Maoists presented two concept papers, and the 
 
130 Crisis Group interviews, Maoist leaders, Kathmandu, January 
2007. The “first international” united communist parties in the 
pre-Russian revolution period; the second and third internationals 
were established by Lenin and Stalin respectively, following 
which there has been no such forum. 
131 Crisis Group interview, Maoist international command source, 
Kathmandu, November 2006. (The “international command” 
is the CPN(M)’s foreign affairs and relations department; see 
below.) 
132 Ibid. 
133 Crisis Group interviews, Maoist leaders, Kathmandu, 
November 2006. 
134 Crisis Group interview, Maoist international command source, 
Kathmandu, November 2006. 
135 The seminar took place at an unspecified location in Nepal 
on 26-30 December 2006. 
136 The participant parties were: the Communist Party of 
Afghanistan, Communist Party of Bhutan (MLM), Communist 
Party of India (Maoist), Communist Party of India (MLM), 
Communist Party of India (ML-Naxalbari), Communist Party of 
Iran (MLM), CPN (Maoist), Communist Party of the Philippines, 
Maoist Communist Party-Italy, Maoist Communist Party (Turkey 
and North Kurdistan), Proletarian Party of East Bengal (CC), 
and the Proletarian Party of East Bengal (Maoist Unity Group). 
The Revolutionary Communist Party, USA and the Workers’ 
Party of Iran were observers. See “Press communiqué of the 
International Seminar on Imperialism and Proletarian Revolution 
in the 21st Century”, A World to Win News Service, 19 February 
2007. 
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Nepali Maoists tried to present themselves as the leaders 
of the international communist movement.137
In December 2006, Nepali Maoists also hosted RIM’s 
sixth South Asian regional conference, with seven member 
parties participating.138 The other parties expressed many 
reservations over the CPN(M)’s “revolutionary experiment”. 
Still, they agreed to pursue their ideological struggle in 
private and to launch a “Nepal campaign” across South 
Asia to support Nepal’s Maoist movement.139 One problem 
was that the CPI (Maoist) is not a RIM member and was 
not at the meeting.140 Although CCOMPOSA is only a 
regional grouping, the fact that it includes the CPI (Maoist) 
makes it more important to the Nepali Maoists than the 
global RIM. Only if they win support from South Asian 
Maoists parties, including the CPI (Maoist), can they 
build an effective international network. None of these 
difficulties has dulled the Maoists’ ambition. Prachanda 
declares that, “even if we are a small country in South 
Asia, we think that our revolution can have impact all 
over the world”.141
 
137 Crisis Group interview, Maoist international command source, 
Kathmandu, January 2007. 
138 Participating parties were: CPN(M), Communist Party of 
India (MLM), Communist Party of India (ML-Naxalbari), 
Communist Party of Afghanistan (Maoist), Bhutan Communist 
Party (MLM), Bangladesher Samyobadi Dal (ML) and Purbo 
Banglar Sarbohara Party (CC). Dipak Sapkota, “Chautho 
internationalka lagi pahal”, Mulyankan, February 2007. Two 
Bangladeshi Maoist leaders entered Nepal clandestinely by 
the eastern border crossing of Kakarbhitta. “Prachandako 
surakshartha bishesh dasta”, Jana Aastha, 27 December 2006. 
139 Crisis Group interview, Maoist leader, Kathmandu, 
December 2006. 
140 One of the CPI (Maoist)’s founder members, the MCC-I, 
was a RIM member but its other main constituent, the CPI-
ML(PW), was not; the CPI (Maoist) is now an observer within 
RIM and applying for full membership. 
141 Interview with Prachanda, L’espresso, op. cit. Elsewhere he 
has elaborated: “If [our revolution is] successful in Nepal, it has 
and will have direct impact on the one billion people of India, 
and it will also spill over into China. When it affects two or two 
and a half billion people, it means it will have impact all over 
the world”. Interview with Prachanda, The Kathmandu Post, 7 
February 2006. 
V. COOPERATION, CONTENTION 
AND CONFRONTATION 
While Maoist strategy documents attempt to bring 
coherence to their new situation, CPN(M) leaders face a 
complex task of balancing competing imperatives and 
pursuing sometimes conflicting tactics. Their headline 
policy is one of cooperation: maintaining the overall unity 
of the eight-party interim government and crafting a stronger 
alliance of leftist/republican forces. They have to maintain 
unity and discipline within their movement while managing 
the reshaping of their domestic and international relations. 
At the same time their private – and increasingly public 
– assessment is that the peace process will inevitably bring 
further confrontations, for which they are preparing. 
A. THE MAOISTS ON THE THRESHOLD OF 
RESPECTABILITY 
The Maoists are slowly becoming part of the establishment 
in three areas: 
In parliament. Maoist members of the interim legislature 
are showing signs of learning how to play by the rules 
but are not yet ready to follow all of them. They took a 
constructive role in various debates and have supported 
amending the interim constitution to introduce federalism 
and revise the electoral system.142 Maoist lawmakers have 
a good attendance record; some have been appointed to 
cross-party committees.143 They have quickly adopted the 
usual parliamentary tactics – such as forcing adjournments 
or resorting to more dramatic protests to stall proceedings144 
– and have pointed out that they are receiving training on 
proper parliamentary behaviour.145 Still, taking part in 
the legislature is not the same as embracing democratic 
principles. Among the more dramatic departures from 
basic standards, one Maoist lawmaker claimed to have 
 
 
142 For example, Krishna Bahadur Mahara and Dev Gurung 
spoke extensively about the role of the Maoists in bringing 
progressive change in the country during the inaugural session 
of the interim legislature. Other Maoist MPs have participated 
in discussions on water resources and drinking water. 
143 For example, Devi Khadka and Lokendra Bista are members 
of the Natural Resources Committee.  
144 For example, on 27 March 2007 they protested the formation 
of the Electoral Constituency Delineation Commission, 
complaining that appointments were decided unilaterally, by 
chanting slogans and surrounding the speaker’s rostrum. In the 
last week of April, they disrupted the legislature again, demanding 
the immediate announcement of constituent assembly elections.  
145 The Maoists’ parliamentary affairs department, headed 
by Baburam Bhattarai and other leaders, gave classes to their 
newly appointed lawmakers just before the start of the interim 
legislature’s first session. 
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brought a gun into the house and threatened his 
opponents.146 Top leaders such as Prachanda and Bhattarai 
have not joined the interim legislature, leaving some to 
question their commitment to the parliamentary system. 
In government. The Maoists joined the interim government 
on 1 April 2007. Their ministers are behaving much like 
their counterparts from other parties, fulfilling their day-
to-day duties while pushing their own agenda.147 Their 
relationship with a fairly conservative bureaucracy is not 
straightforward; they have asked permission to transfer 
senior civil servants and to replace some with political 
appointees.148 Apart from appointing sympathetic journalists 
as advisers, Information Minister Mahara has reportedly 
told the state-owned media to highlight Maoist leaders’ 
statements.149 All these trends are in keeping with patterns 
established by successive democratic governments, and 
the Maoists have been similarly pragmatic when forced 
to accept policies they instinctively dislike. Once in power, 
Mahara rapidly reversed his opposition to foreign 
investment in the media;150 Hisila Yami backed public-
private partnerships for water supply. 151 While Maoist 
ministers have clashed with their cabinet colleagues, the 
top leadership has tried to patch up misunderstandings.152
 
 
146 On 26 February 2007, during an all-party meeting in the 
parliamentary secretariat, Lokendra Bista said he was carrying a 
pistol and dared other lawmakers to take action against him. 
After objections, Maoist deputy leader Dev Gurung apologised 
for the incident. “Lawmakers express objection to Maoist MP’s 
statement on arms”, nepalnews.com, 1 March 2007. 
147 For example, Mahara has announced that a right to 
information bill will soon be tabled. Forest Minister Matrika 
Yadav promised to crack down on smuggling of forest produce, 
while Minister for Planning and Physical Works Hisila Yami 
announced that the government will not privatise water utilities 
in Kathmandu. 
148 “Maoist ministers seek to appoint, transfer officials”, 
ekantipur.com, 26 April 2007. 
149 Mahara has appointed Maheshwor Dahal, former editor of 
the Maoist mouthpiece Janadesh, as his adviser. Sachin Roka 
and Bishnu Prasad Sapkota, coordinators of Maoist-run FM 
stations, have been appointed to run two politics programs 
on state-owned Radio Nepal. These appointments have led to 
concerns among mainstream journalists that there will be a 
concerted squeeze on the expression of liberal, non-Maoist 
viewpoints; Mahara’s refusal to apologise for the killing of 
journalists during the conflict has also added to worries about 
Maoist attitudes on press freedom. 
150 “No curb on foreign investment in media now”, 
nepalnews.com, 2 April 2007. 
151 “Campaign to promote household water treatment”, 
nepalnews.com, 23 April 2007. 
152 For example, in a cabinet meeting, Prime Minister Koirala, 
who also holds the defence portfolio, rebuked Yadav for publicly 
accusing the Nepal Army of felling trees and killing endangered 
animals. Yadav cited the right to speak on matters within his 
ministerial jurisdiction, leading to a brief spat with Koirala and 
In dealing with the international community. The 
Maoists have managed to win a degree of international 
recognition – something that was always denied to them 
while underground. Maoist ministers regularly meet 
ambassadors and donors, most of whom have continued 
to support Maoist-run ministries, and have had some high-
profile encounters with visiting dignitaries.153 Their 
engagement with the UN has made it easier for other 
countries to stop considering them as untouchables, although 
the U.S. still considers them terrorists and does not deal 
with them.154 A British minister who met Maoist leaders 
Bhattarai and Mahara was impressed by their willingness 
to engage with the outside world but stressed that 
encouragement of their role in the peace process will always 
be accompanied by strong messages on abandoning 
violence.155 International actors who have pressed for 
action on human rights are dismayed by Maoist failure to 
implement many of their commitments, from demobilising 
underage soldiers and enabling the safe return of internally 
displaced people to guaranteeing fundamental rights such 
as press freedom.156
B. A UNITED LEFT? 
The Maoists and mainstream leftist parties share some 
common policies and may agree to a tactical alliance, 
especially if the NC reunites and also draws on the support 
of smaller parties to form a more powerful conservative 
bloc. But there is still an ideological gulf between the 
Maoists and the UML, and each party is determined to 
assert itself as the leader of a broader leftist front. The 
Maoists have used the structure of the peace process – in 
which they and NC are the decision-making core – to 
weaken the UML’s position. Internal politics will play a 
role in determining whether a working understanding 
 
walk-out by Maoist ministers. The issue was resolved only after 
Prachanda and Bhattarai visited the prime minister. 
153 For example, Gareth Thomas, a British international 
development minister, met senior Maoist leaders and assured 
them of support to the peace process but warned there should be 
no intimidation in the run-up to the constituent assembly polls. 
154 For the list of terrorist organisations, see www.treasury. 
gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/terror/terror.pdf. The 
Janatantrik Tarai Mukti Morcha, a violent Tarai outfit, has 
also been added to the list. “U.S. says Maoists still a terrorist 
organisation; JTMM added”, nepalnews.com, 2 May 2007. The 
American ambassador has consistently stated that the U.S. will 
review the Maoists’ status only if they completely abandon 
violence. Interview with Ambassador James F. Moriarty, 
Dishanirdesh, Nepal Television, 26 March 2007. 
155 Crisis Group interview, Gareth Thomas, Parliamentary Under-
Secretary of State for International Development, London, 
May 2007. 
156 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, Brussels and London, 
May 2007. 
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can be reached: both parties have factions for and against 
an alliance. 
The case for a working alliance appears to be strong. Leftist 
parties can unite around the republican agenda (though 
some are more fervent believers than others, and there are 
differences over how to achieve the republic157), make a 
stronger stand within the legislature and government against 
what they see as NC heel-dragging, and maximise the left’s 
potential at the ballot box as and when elections go ahead. 
Leaders of both parties stress that outright unification is 
impossible but a form of united front could be built.158
Private feelers have given way to more public consideration 
of options. On 22 April 2007 (Lenin’s birthday and the 
57th anniversary of the original Communist Party of 
Nepal’s establishment) the Maoists hosted a cross-party 
leftist leaders’ gathering in Kathmandu. Most speakers 
wanted “to cement the absolute majority commanded by 
the communist forces in the parliament, the cabinet and 
the street”.159 Baburam Bhattarai said: “Let us fuse the 
ideologies espoused by late Pushpa Lal, late Madan 
Bhandari and Prachanda”.160 Prachanda and UML General 
Secretary Madhav Kumar Nepal held a follow-up meeting 
in which, according to Prachanda, they agreed to form a 
left republican alliance.161
This process will probably gain momentum if an election 
date is announced. Both the CPN(M) and UML fear that 
ongoing rivalry within the left could damage their individual 
election prospects. The Maoists, who lack an established 
voter base, may see advantage in a seat-sharing arrangement 
to avoid competing against the UML in most of the first-
past-the-post constituencies. The UML might trade this 
off in return for assurances of support in the proportional 
part of the vote.162
 
 
157 As doubts grew over whether CA elections would happen, 
Prachanda demanded the interim legislature immediately declare 
a republic; the UML revived its proposal for a referendum on 
the monarchy. The Maoists said they would support the UML 
proposal but Prime Minister Koirala is not ready for either option. 
158 Crisis Group interviews, Maoist and UML leaders, 
Kathmandu, April 2007. 
159 Sanjaya Dhakal, “Red Storm Rising?”, nepalnews.com, 23 
April 2007. 
160 Ibid. Pushpa Lal was the Communist Party of Nepal’s first 
leader; Madan Bhandari, who died in a road accident in 1994, 
was the UML’s general secretary and architect of its transition 
into a mainstream party that accepted parliamentary democracy. 
161 “UML, Maoists discuss left unity; bash PM”, nepalnews.com, 
25 April 2007. 
162 The CA election system will be partly first-past-the-post 
constituency-based and partly list-based proportional 
representation. For the FTTP constituencies, a delimitation 
commission headed by former Supreme Court judge Arjun 
Bahadur Singh has proposed the hill and mountain regions should 
Both Maoists and UML leaders have warned that anti-
communists want to prevent the polls. In Madhav Nepal’s 
words, “reactionaries are trying to disrupt the forthcoming 
CA elections as they fear a communist majority in the 
CA”.163 In fact, the various communist parties already 
command a majority in both the legislature and the cabinet 
but have been unable to leverage this due to their own 
internal differences.164 This is unsurprising given the 
Maoists’ outlook: their engagement with the UML and 
India’s CPM is at heart contingent and instrumental. They 
have pressed ahead where they have seen advantage in 
the relationship but their priority remains to push for more 
radical change than mainstream communists can stomach. 
C. TRANSITIONAL TENSIONS 
The Maoists remain a fairly cohesive movement and are 
sticking to the framework of the peace process as their 
preferred route forward. However, their current unity and 
commitment to a peaceful compromise cannot be taken for 
granted. If the elections do not take place and a republic 
is not established by other means, they will revert to 
insurrectionary tactics. If neither route is successful, they 
will face serious internal tensions. As outlined above, the 
Maoists arrived at their current strategy after much debate; 
individuals and groups opposed to the policy of “peaceful 
revolution” will be quick to seize upon any serious stumbles. 
Since October 2005 the CPN(M) has followed Baburam 
Bhattarai’s political line and Prachanda’s leadership; both 
top figures will have tough questions to answer if they fail 
to deliver. The untested CA hypothesis – which had been 
sold to sceptics as “an experiment in revolution”165 – came 
under attack in the April 2007 central committee meeting. 
Netra Bikram Chand (Biplov), a younger generation leader 
who represents the Maoist stronghold of Rolpa and is 
currently in charge of the far-western command, won 
majority support for a new line which rejected the basis 
of the peace process.166 In his words: 
 
have 124 seats and the Tarai 116. See Madhav Dhungel, 
“Nirvachan kshetrako tanatan”, Nepal, 29 April 2007. 
163 “Reactionaries fear communist majority in CA: MK Nepal”, 
nepalnews.com, 22 April 2007. 
164 Five of the eight ruling parties are communist (CPN(M), 
UML, NWPP, ULF and Janamorcha Nepal), as are twelve of the 
22 cabinet ministers. Communists have 182 of the 329 seats 
in the interim legislature (UML 83, CPN(M) 83, Janamorcha 9, 
NWPP 4 and ULF 3), including the speaker; even if NC reunites, 
it has only 134 seats. See www.parliament.gov.np/member 
hr.htm. 
165 Crisis Group interviews, Maoist leaders and cadres, 
Kathmandu, 2006. 
166 Crisis Group interview, Maoist leaders, Kathmandu, April 
2007. 
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We have been constantly raising three demands: 
the restructuring of the state, constituent assembly 
elections and a federal democratic republic.…But 
in a way we have ended up sacrificing and 
undermining the basic concept and achievements 
of our ten-year people’s war for the sake of these 
tactical objectives. Sadly it is now clear that 
following America and India’s plan, Girija Prasad 
and the dalal tendency167 are using our own 
weakness and sacrifices as weapons to advance 
their conspiracy to finish us off and scupper the 
restructuring of the state, constituent assembly 
elections and federal democratic republic.168
Bhattarai opposed targeting India but accepted the party 
decision. While the new line was officially set by Prachanda, 
key elements were based on Biplov’s arguments and 
senior leader Mohan Vaidya’s advice. Their and Bhattarai’s 
perspectives are quite far apart but Prachanda is attempting 
a middle path between them. The CPN(M) has always 
contained some factions and lobbies but they were largely 
invisible during its underground days. Some groups are 
based on loyalties that predate the party’s formation,169 
some coalesce around ideological positions; there are also 
occasional personality clashes and rivalry between leaders, 
most of whom have their own coteries. 
Still, there is little likelihood of an imminent split or, despite 
the aggressive language of certain lobbies, a return to all-
out war. The ever more public display of doubts over the 
peace process may make Prachanda look weak but may 
also strengthen his hand in negotiations with the other 
parties – he can credibly point to the difficulty of selling 
the process to cadres that are becoming restive at the loss 
of momentum. Commanders still have control over PLA 
fighters but must assuage their dissatisfaction on two fronts: 
they are suffering from the cantonments’ poor physical 
infrastructure, and some are starting to wonder if the 
party leadership will be able to deliver a satisfactory 
settlement, including a genuine merger of the PLA and 
NA.170 Discipline problems appear to be growing, from 
lower level cadres’ disrespect of party decisions to 
 
 
167 A dalal is literally a go-between or middleman. For the 
Maoists, this term covers both comprador capitalists (and their 
local brokers) and politicians compromised by working for 
outside interests (the main targets in this instance). 
168 Biplov, “Naya karyanitilai dhridhatapurvak karyanvayan 
garaun”, Janadesh, 17 April 2007. 
169 Members of the parties that joined to form the CPN(M) 
sometimes function as distinct lobbies within it. For example, 
Baburam Bhattarai represents the former CPN (Mashal), while 
Prachanda, Baidya and Badal were with its rival, Masal. 
170 Crisis Group interview, PLA source, Kathmandu, April 2007. 
The interviewee suggested that following the cantonment 
process, relations between the PLA and the party’s political 
leadership had somewhat cooled. 
unauthorised extortion and intimidation; a central 
monitoring committee led by Mohan Vaidya recommended 
that the party take steps to reestablish discipline.171  
D. CLASHES TO COME 
Maoist leaders believe that further political confrontation 
is inevitable, whether they follow the CA route or opt for 
revolt. In their view, the king, sections of the army and 
other royalist elements will try to obstruct the CA and may 
go so far as attempting a coup to halt the process. (The 
Maoists would counter this by mobilising a mass movement 
and making their own bid to seize power.) As always, they 
see deliberate polarisation as one of the best means of 
moving the political process forward. If their efforts 
to encourage a sharper polarisation between leftist and 
conservative political forces are successful, this may 
heighten the likelihood of confrontation. There are four 
areas where clashes are likely. 
Nepali Congress. The complex relationship between 
the Maoist leadership and Prime Minister Girija Prasad 
Koirala (who leads the NC) lies at the heart of the peace 
process. On one level they have built a successful working 
partnership: the CPN(M) and NC have been the drivers 
of the peace process and the key arbiters of disputes during 
the negotiations, often to the exclusion of other parties.172 
The Maoists have devoted serious attention to studying 
Koirala’s character and political behaviour and have 
exploited the fact that he relies more on personal confidants 
than party or government structures. Prachanda and 
Bhattarai have won a degree of trust with Koirala and his 
main gatekeepers, and this has served them well.173 But 
both sides know that their relationship is fundamentally 
antagonistic: they share an interest in marginalising other 
political players only so that there is a less crowded arena 
for their future showdown.174
 
171 Vaidya’s committee organised a national training program in 
April 2007 that concluded the CPN(M) needed a “purification 
process”. “Yasari hundaichha maobadi shuddhikrit”, Pahal, 6 
May 2007. Such efforts are nothing new. Maintaining discipline 
and political coherence is a constant challenge which has 
frequently demanded leaders’ attention. See Crisis Group Report, 
Nepal’s Maoists, op. cit., pp. 12-14. 
172 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Peace Agreement, op. cit. 
173 It was Koirala’s trusted emissaries, in particular his nephew 
Shekhar Koirala and current home minister Krishna Prasad 
Sitaula, who initiated the secret dialogue with the Maoists 
in Delhi in the spring of 2005 and did more than any other 
mainstream party leaders to shape the eventual November 2005 
deal. See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s New Alliance, op. cit. 
174 This consideration informs Maoist tactics in dealing with 
possible allies on the left and also underlies the NC’s reluctance 
to drop the monarchy entirely: by holding out the chance of a 
ceremonial role for the king it can win the backing of moderate 
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This subtle relationship plays out in a strange, but not 
illogical, mix of cooperation and frontal assault. Each party 
needs the other but it also needs to keep up a barrage of 
charge and counter-charge, partly to shift the blame for 
delays in the process and partly to manoeuvre on more 
substantive issues. When Koirala needled the Maoists by 
saying he was bringing “terrorists” to the mainstream, 
Prachanda retorted: “Wait and see. The coming days will 
show who brought whom”.175 Their main policy difference 
is over the monarchy. If the elections are delayed, the 
Maoists want the interim legislature to declare a republic; 
Koirala has generally advocated a ceremonial monarchy 
(while suggesting Gyanendra abdicate in favour of his 
grandson, Hridayendra), although if he felt the country 
were irrevocably heading towards republicanism, he would 
want to position the NC at the forefront of any change. 
Other more immediate issues have already led to friction 
and could cause escalating tension. These include the lack 
of action on the Rayamajhi commission report;176 failure 
to investigate disappearances;177 and the lack of interest 
in implementing key elements of the CPA, from land 
reform to army restructuring.178 Soon after joining the 
interim government, the Maoists upped the ante. They 
accused Koirala of deliberately delaying the constitutional 
process, and the April 2007 central committee meeting 
 
 
royalists who know they cannot face off against the Maoists on 
their own. On NC calculations see Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s 
Peace Agreement, op. cit., pp. 16-18. Former royalist prime 
minister and Rastriya Janashakti Party Chairman Surya Bahadur 
Thapa has already responded to the signs of left cooperation by 
calling for unity among “democratic forces”, saying that “Nepali 
Congress, as the biggest democratic party, should take the 
lead, and Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala should take the 
initiative”. The Himalayan Times, 29 April 2007. 
175 S. Chandrasekharan, “Nepal: CEC urges postponement of 
CA Elections”, saag.org/notes4/note378.html. 
176 The Rayamajhi Commission was formed to probe the royal 
government’s use of force to suppress the April 2006 movement. 
Its report has not been published, and no action has been taken 
against any of those it criticised for their actions. 
177 The CPA committed both the state and the Maoists to 
investigate outstanding cases of forced disappearances within 60 
days. Neither side has implemented this commitment; the state 
is responsible for many more alleged disappearances (around 
1,300), some of which have been well documented, such as the 
four dozen supposed Maoist activists who were secretly detained, 
tortured and probably killed by the RNA in late 2003. See 
“Report of investigation into arbitrary detention, torture and 
disappearances at Maharajgunj RNA barracks, Kathmandu, in 
2003–2004”, Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR), Kathmandu, 2006, at http://nepal.ohchr.org/ 
en/index.html. 
178 For example, the state has still not released all Maoists 
detainees, has not nationalised royal property and has not formed 
the national peace and rehabilitation commission specified in 
the CPA. 
decided to target him from all fronts – the street, parliament 
and government.179 Maoist MPs started disrupting 
legislature sessions and their ministers boycotted the 18 
April cabinet meeting.180
If there is agreement on dealing with the monarchy, the 
confrontation with Congress may be postponed or even 
avoided. For all their public griping, the Maoists have 
generally been happy to support Koirala as prime minister 
– not least because he is likely to bequeath the NC a messy 
succession struggle, which they hope to exploit. Still, both 
parties recognise that their visions of a future Nepal and 
its political institutions are very different. There will have 
to be a battle over the direction the country takes and 
they are determined to lead the opposing forces in it. 
The monarchy. Despite their past dalliance with the 
palace, ending the monarchy is a core issue for the Maoists. 
They have always assumed that a transition towards a 
republic could only come about through a decisive final 
confrontation. The November 2005 Chunbang meeting 
concluded that “the party should never, and will never, 
fall prey to the fantasy that monarchy can be easily ended 
through the CA and a republic will appear just like that”.181 
This conclusion has not changed. According to Maoist 
leader Badal, they have only destroyed the enemy’s outer 
periphery; the inner circle (i.e., the monarchy) is yet 
to break.182
The king has been quiet but not passive. In the face of cuts 
to his status and privileges, he has dug in his heels with a 
mix of truculence and defiance. When the government 
brought the royal palace service under the civil service 
and ordered the dismissal of key officials, Gyanendra 
extended their tenure and promoted them.183 He refused 
to answer the Rayamajhi Commission’s queries about his 
role in suppressing the April 2006 movement and justified 
his 2005 coup in a “democracy day message” on 19 
February 2007.184 On the anniversary of his surrender of 
power, he made a very public, army-escorted temple visit, 
 
179 “Khulyo morcha sangharshko” Janadesh, 1 May 2007. 
180 The Maoists were also disappointed when Koirala formally 
invited the Madheshi Janadhikar Forum (MJF) for talks, granting 
it recognition despite the fact that its activists killed 30 Maoists 
in Gaur on 21 March 2007, when they clashed while organising 
rival meetings. Police raids on Maoist Young Communist League 
offices in Kathmandu, Bhaktapur and Lalitpur on 15 April 2007, 
reportedly on the prime minister’s orders, added to tensions. 
181 See Nepal kamyunist parti (maobadi) ko aitihasik 
dastavejharu, op. cit., p. 314. 
182 Badal, “Jatiya mukti aandolan ra baigyanik karyadishako 
prashna”, Hamro Jaljala, September 2006.  
183 Crisis Group interview, government official, Kathmandu, 
April 2007. 
184 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal's Peace Agreement, op. cit., 
p. 21. 
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received a 21-gun salute from the NA and had the old, 
abolished, national anthem played – none of which 
seemed in keeping with the letter or spirit of the interim 
constitution.185 Gyanendra still has some support from 
small political parties,186 a few international sympathisers, 
a section of the army and his 3,000-strong palace guard. 
The Nepalese Army. There is likely to be increased friction 
with the NA over its unwillingness to countenance 
substantive reform and continuing resistance to democratic 
control. The army’s traditional loyalty to the palace has 
theoretically been severed, and some generals say they 
have no desire to burn their fingers by serving the king’s 
ambitions once again.187 Still, they will take “strong steps” 
to protect their institutional interests, which could extend 
to stepping in if the country faces serious instability.188 
They will also hold out against merging Maoist fighters 
into a reformed force, citing reasons of professionalism 
and political neutrality but privately determined that 
as a militarily undefeated force, they should not have 
unpalatable reforms imposed on them. 
Resolving these questions will be difficult even if a republic 
is smoothly established. The Maoists’ and army’s mutual 
distrust is understandable: each has good reason to question 
the other’s intentions. Maoists leaders fear a serious attempt 
at army restructuring could prompt an army revolt backed 
by foreign powers opposed to the emergence of the radical 
left.189 The army suspects that Maoist talk of merging 
the two forces is thin cover for a plan to take it over from 
within and disable the last bulwark against full Maoist 
control. The only peaceful way out of this deadlock is a 
process of security sector reform that leaves the army less 
likely to play politics but also prevents the security 
forces becoming the tools of any one political grouping. 
Unfortunately, no mainstream party is interested in pursuing 
this agenda. The timid are still too scared of the army 
 
 
185 The interim constitution, promulgated on 15 January 2007, 
in effect suspended the monarchy and left the prime minister 
to assume the head of state’s duties. Prime Minister Koirala 
received the credentials of a new ambassador for the first time 
in April 2007, a role that previously was performed by the king. 
“PM Koirala receives credentials of Chinese ambassador”, 
nepalnews.com, 19 April 2007. 
186 A handful of small royalist parties have applied for registration 
with the Election Commission: the Rastriya Prajatantra Party 
(Nepal), Nepal Sadbhavana Party, Samajbadi Party and 
Janamukti Party. “Four pro-monarchy parties registered with 
EC”, nepalnews.com, 20 April 2007. 
187 The interim constitution and amended Army Act place the 
army under the direct control of the government. 
188 Crisis Group interviews, security and political sources, 
Kathmandu, November-December 2006. 
189 Crisis Group interviews, Maoist leaders, Kathmandu, 
November 2006. 
to demand action; the confident are too tempted by the 
idea of trying to turn it into their own instrument. 
India. Nepal’s most influential neighbour prompts deep 
ambivalence among the Maoists. India looked favourably 
on them in the early years of the insurgency, and they long 
saw it as a fairly safe refuge. But as Delhi adopted a 
tougher line, the Maoists in turn played on latent anti-Indian 
sentiment among their supporters. They accepted Indian 
facilitation of the November 2005 deal with the SPA partly 
out of necessity and partly on the understanding that Delhi 
would drop its longstanding support for constitutional 
monarchy. The Maoists did not imagine India would remain 
sympathetic indefinitely, so they planned to keep it at arms 
length until a republic was established and then review 
relations.190 For a year after the April 2006 movement, 
they behaved cautiously and diplomatically, reining in 
anti-Indian rhetoric and recognising the need for constructive 
engagement.191
However, the strains are showing. The 2007 central 
committee meeting concluded that India had not dropped its 
twin-pillar policy and was trying to preserve a ceremonial 
monarchy. The Maoists also allege that Indian intelligence 
agencies are waging a covert war against them through 
regional armed groups such as the Janatantrik Tarai Mukti 
Morcha.192 This has led to a slight backtracking: the Maoists 
have decided to give priority to “nationality” alongside 
republicanism, implying that they once again see Delhi 
as a serious threat to the nation. Their leaders say they 
will only restore warmer relations if India supports 
republicanism.193 They are aware that they cannot afford 
to anger their neighbour, that “no government can 
survive here without some support from New Delhi”.194 
Nevertheless, this relationship will experience further 
tensions. 
United Nations. The Maoists called early and consistently 
for UN involvement in a peace process. However, they 
have always been suspicious of the UN (tending to view 
it as subordinate to Western/imperialist interests) and sought 
its engagement for a clearly limited function. They realised 
that bringing in the UN could help them effect the transition 
into open politics safely and with recognition, especially 
for the PLA. But if the UN-led arms management process 
 
190 Crisis Group interviews, Maoist leaders, Kathmandu, 
November 2006. 
191 On his first formal visit to India in November 2006, Prachanda 
met former prime ministers and expressed thanks for India’s 
support for the democratic movement. See “Visit To The South”, 
Spotlight, 24 November 2006. 
192 Sudheer Sharma, “Maobadima pherieko bharat-rananiti”, 
Kantipur, 23 April 2007. 
193 Crisis Group interviews, Maoist leaders, Kathmandu, April 
2007. 
194 Crisis Group interview, Baburam Bhattarai, April 2007. 
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cannot deliver a deal on the longer term merging of their 
fighters into a new national army, there will be further 
criticism of the original decision. Prachanda has followed 
the example of other Maoist leaders in publicly criticising 
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ian 
Martin.195 Although plenty of politicians from other parties 
have also been happy to use the UN as a convenient 
scapegoat, the Maoists are willing to stall a key element of 
the arms process – the verification of their combatants 
– to demand faster progress from other parties and to 
remind the international community that they do not feel 
obliged to fulfil their part of the deal if others hold back 
on their own commitments. 
E. PLAN B 
The Maoists have from the outset warned that they will 
keep other revolutionary options open if the peace process 
fails. Such warnings are partly bravado and brinkmanship 
(for example, the “October revolution” that they threatened 
in 2006 was never a realistic option) but also reflect serious 
fallback plans. Maoist strategists are having second thoughts 
about the constituent assembly: they fear that delays may 
strengthen the palace’s hand and that even if the CA 
declares a republic, the king will not accept its decision 
without a fight.196
Prachanda has long threatened revolt if the elections are 
not held on time;197 when a delay became inevitable, Maoist 
leaders made a show of blaming Prime Minister Koirala’s 
“grand conspiracy”.198 Prachanda announced the end of 
unity with the SPA and warned that agreement on declaring 
a republic through the interim legislature can be the only 
base for its renewal.199 The April 2007 central committee 
meeting also approved a plan to launch a mass movement, 
suggesting the start of more serious confrontation. Initially, 
the Maoists are collecting signatures for a republican 
 
 
195 Prachanda criticised Martin’s assertion that the Maoists had 
imposed preconditions for cooperating in the second stage of 
PLA verification. See “Prachanda criticises Martin, says no 
preconditions have been set for verification”, nepalnews.com, 
3 May 2007. 
196 Crisis Group interviews, Maoist leaders, Kathmandu, May 
2007. 
197 Interview with Prachanda, Sanshleshan, December 2006.  
198 Biplov, “Naya karyanitilai dhridhatapurvak karyanvayan 
garaun”, Janadesh, 17 April 2007. The government has not 
officially announced that it cannot meet the proposed June date 
but on 12 April 2007 Chief Election Commissioner Bhojraj 
Pokhrel wrote to the prime minister saying he would need at 
least 110 days to prepare for polls, in effect pushing back 
the likely election date to November, after the monsoon and 
festival season. 
199 “Ekatako naya adhar sojhai ganatantra”, Janadesh, 17 April 
2007. 
petition but they also have plans to surround Singha Durbar, 
the seat of government, to take their protest to the top.200 
The first goal is to pressure Prime Minister Koirala into 
concessions; failing this they will experiment with their 
mass movement plan.201
The Maoists, like most other parties, were rarely as 
enthusiastic about the elections in private as they made out 
in public. They were neither convinced the CA could 
deliver revolutionary change nor as sure of their electoral 
prospects as they would have liked. The delay in the polls 
is a convenient opportunity to push for more rapid change 
and to placate growing unrest in their party. 
The likelihood of a further confrontation was the main 
rationale for reorganisation of the Maoists’ militant wing, 
the Young Communist League (YCL). The YCL was first 
formed in the early 1990s, during the initial preparations 
for people’s war. It was then converted into the guerrilla 
squads which were the forerunners of the PLA and in 
December 2006 relaunched by the CPN(M)’s December 
2006 central committee meeting.202 Although its members 
are largely unarmed youths, in keeping with its military 
origins it is led by PLA commanders who did not go into 
the cantonments. Former PLA fourth division commander 
Rashmi (Ganeshman Pun of Rukum) is the chairman of 
its 25-member central committee. 
Semi-underground YCL committees have been formed 
from central to regional, district and village level. Groups 
of members are based in Kathmandu and other urban 
areas, while former militia members make up the bulk 
of its presence in villages. NC leader Sujata Koirala (the 
prime minister’s daughter) has alleged that the YCL 
is training its cadres in “booth capturing” for the CA 
election.203 YCL units have been openly carrying out extra-
legal activities in Kathmandu like a parallel police force;204 
in April 2007 the state police started to take action against 
them but it is not clear if this will significantly limit their 
capacity.205 Some of their actions are calculated to win 
sympathy (they have helped with traffic management, 
embarked on city clean-up campaigns and seized illegally 
imported goods to hand over to the police) but this only 
adds to the consternation of mainstream parties, who fear 
the combination of populism backed by intimidation. 
 
200 “Lakhaun janatale singhdarbar gherne”, Pahal, 6 May 2007. 
201 Crisis Group interview, Maoist leader, Kathmandu, April 
2007. 
202 This meeting was held on 12-20 December 2006 in 
Bhaktapur. 
203 “Sujata accuses YCL of training on booth capturing”, 
nepalnews.com,17 April 2007. 
204 YCL cadres also seized royal land in Sallaghari, Bhaktapur 
on 22 April 2007. 
205 Police raided YCL offices on 15 April 2007; six days later 
they arrested seven YCL cadres from Kapan. 
Nepal’s Maoists: Purists or Pragmatists? 
Crisis Group Asia Report N°132, 18 May 2007 Page 24 
 
 
 
 
In case of a violent confrontation, the YCL will be 
mobilised as the Maoists’ primary frontline force but the 
PLA is also standing by in reserve.206 Prachanda has said, 
“if reactionaries take action against the consensus, then 
a revolt will take place in Nepal and we will lead it. There 
will be no alternative but for the PLA to come out of the 
cantonments to join the revolt alongside millions of 
people”.207 Although most of their fighters and weapons 
are confined in the UN-supervised cantonments, Maoists 
leaders view this arrangement as valid only for enabling 
the CA elections. If the process falls apart, they will readily 
consider remobilising the PLA and calling it out with its 
weapons.208 Frequent demonstrations by cantoned PLA 
troops outside their camps are meant to remind their political 
rivals that they still have other options and may not be 
afraid to use them. 
 
206 Crisis Group interview, YCL source, Kathmandu, January 
2007. 
207 Interview with Prachanda, Sansheleshan, op. cit. 
208 Crisis Group interview, PLA deputy commander, Kathmandu, 
December 2006. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Nepal’s Maoists have been driven by ideological purism 
but managed to sustain their long insurgency and enter a 
peace process thanks to their pragmatism. The tension 
between these opposing impulses lies at the heart of their 
evolving approach to strategy and tactics. Their commitment 
to the peace process is not hollow but it is conditional: 
progress (which, for them, would have to include some 
radical reforms) would strengthen the hand of more 
moderate leaders who have argued the case for compromise. 
If the process stalls, those who prefer a return to 
confrontation will feel emboldened – as will those who 
are still hoping the peace deal will fall apart. 
Kathmandu/Brussels, 18 May 2007
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CA constituent assembly 
CCOMPOSA Coordinating Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia 
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
CPI (Maoist) Communist Party of India (Maoist) 
CPI-ML (Liberation) Communist Party of India-Marxist-Leninist (Liberation) 
CPI-ML(PW) Communist Party of India-Marxist-Leninist (People’s War) 
CPM Communist Party of India (Marxist) 
CPN(M)  Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) 
CPN (Unity Centre) Communist Party of Nepal (Unity Centre) 
DDTC Development of Democracy in the Twenty-first Century 
MCC-I Maoist Communist Centre of India 
NA/RNA  (Royal) Nepalese Army 
NC Nepali Congress 
NC(D) Nepali Congress (Democratic) 
NSP(A) Nepal Sadbhavana Party (Anandidevi) 
NWPP Nepal Workers and Peasants’ Party 
PLA People’s Liberation Army (Maoist) 
PWG  People’s War Group, see CPI-ML(PW) 
RIM Revolutionary Internationalist Movement 
SPA Seven-Party Alliance 
ULF United Left Front 
UML Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) 
URPC United Revolutionary People’s Council 
WPRM World People’s Resistance Movement 
YCL Young Communist League 
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